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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid industrialization of the Republic of China on the island of
Taiwan during the past thirty years has been accompanied by the entry
of goods "made in Taiwan" into markets around the world. Indeed, for-
eign trade has become the backbone of Taiwan's economy and the impe-
tus for its economic growth. Between 1976 and 1984, for example, year-
to-year growth rates of imports ranged from 7.4% to 34.0%, while ex-
port growth ranged from 14.1% to 53.8%.1 In its ninth medium-term
economic plan, the Council of Economic Planning and Development
("CEPD") calls for Taiwan's economy to grow by an annual average of
6.5% and exports of merchandise to increase by 8.2% annually from
1986 to 1989.2 The four-year plan projects merchandise exports of $40.3
billion and imports of $30.4 billion by 1989.1
These achievements can be traced to a number of unique social,
political, and geographic factors. Not the least important of these factors
has been the government's success in nurturing an economic environ-
ment which has allowed the country's businesses to take advantage of
Taiwan's comparative advantage with a reasonable degree of consistency.
Among the relevant factors influenced or controlled by the Taiwan gov-
ernment are the country's system of business taxation, customs duties,
investment capital structure, commodity pricing and labor supply and
costs. These factors have evolved in such a way as to make exporting
1 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CENTER, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO GEN-
ERAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (April 1986).
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id.
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very profitable both for the Taiwan companies and for the nation as a
whole, resulting in accumulated foreign exchange reserves exceeding $42
billion by the end of 1986.'
To the extent that any of these factors constitutes a preferential ben-
efit bestowed by Taiwan's government, directly or indirectly, upon a
product exported to the United States, it may be held to be a subsidy
countervailable under United States import law.5 The rationale behind
the United States countervailing duty law is that "no domestic manufac-
turer, regardless of how efficient, is able to compete against a foreign
company or companies that are subsidized by their governments.",
6
However, not all foreign government policies affecting production by
companies which export to the United States can possibly represent sub-
sidies countervailable under United States law.7 This Article analyzes
Taiwan's government policies affecting production for export and their
treatment under United States countervailing duty law. After describing
the evolution of Taiwan's trade policy and the present formulation of
Taiwan's law and regulation affecting production for export, the Article
sets forth the applicable provisions of United States countervailing duty
law. Discussion then focuses upon recent countervailing duty proceed-
ings involving Taiwanese products, and concludes with the observation
that the Taiwanese government subsidizes its exports minimally, if at all.
4 Ni, ROC Government's Efforts in Promoting Two-Way Investments Between the ROC and
the USA, Paper delivered at the 10th Joint Conference of USA-ROC and ROC-USA Economic
Councils 5 (Dec. 5, 1986).
5 The relevant United States statute and regulations are at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982), 19
U.S.C.A. § 1671 (1985), and 19 C.F.R. § 355 (1987). For a good summary of the countervailing
duty law, see Sander, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L LAW. 761, 769-72 (1985).
International rules on countervailing duties are derived from Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") as well as the GATT Subsidies Code. Id. at 769.
6 Perry, Trade Laws' Aim: Ease Dislocation and Counteract Unfair Practices, 9 Bus. AM. 3
(Dec. 8, 1986).
In the United States, the first general purpose countervailing duty law was enacted in 1897.
It was based on earlier laws designed to protect the domestic sugar industry from unfair foreign
competition caused by foreign government subsidies ("bounties") paid to private manufacturers
on the exportation of refined sugar. Congress perceived that these bounties allowed foreign
producers to sell below market prices with the effect of injuring domestic sugar companies.
Id.
7 All governments undertake policies that affect production. They range from the very gen-
eral, such as maintaining a non-inflationary macro-economic environment conducive to long-
term growth; to the very specific, such as providing direct grants to keep a faltering firm in
production. These policies include positive actions such as building roads and enforcing con-
tracts, and negative actions such as taxation and pollution controls. If the U.S. countervailing
duty laws were to apply across the board to all policies that may benefit production (or, e.g.,
that penalize production abroad less than comparable U.S. policies), it would be completely
unworkable in its current non-discretionary form.
Horlick, Bello & Levine, The Countervailability of Subsidies: Specificity, in UNITED STATES IMPORT
RELIEF LAWS - CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND POLIcY 37-38 (H. Applebaum & A.
Victor, eds. 1985) [hereinafter IMPORT RELIEF].
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This observation will refute the recurring argument that Taiwanese ex-
port subsidies have contributed to the United States-Taiwan trade deficit.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF TAiwAN's TRADE POLICY
A. The Japanese Colonial Period: 1895 to 1945
Taiwan was under the colonial rule of Japan from 1895 until 1945.
The generally accepted view of Taiwan's economy under Japanese colo-
nial rule is that it constituted "a principally agricultural appendage to the
Japanese economy-with governmental policy focused mainly on in-
creasing agricultural productivity-via both organizational and infras-
tructural investments."' Gustav Ranis, however, has demonstrated
several developments which indicate that this view is misleading. For
instance, the food processing industry became increasingly important,
due to fiscal incentives, and to tariff protection after 1911. Furthermore,
during the 1930's, Japan recognized Taiwan's strategic location and be-
gan to invest more heavily in such non-agricultural infrastructure as
power and transport, as well as in basic industries, such as cement, chem-
icals, pulp and paper, fertilizer, petroleum refining and metallurgy. Fi-
nally, the transport network and electrification works were directed not
toward the narrow purpose of extracting and exporting primary raw
materials or minerals, but instead toward the purpose of a broad agricul-
tural mobilization.9
B. The Immediate Post-War Period: 1945 to 1949
Allied bombing during World War II resulted in significant damage
to both industrial plant and infrastructure. In addition, Taiwan's return
to Chinese control after World War II necessitated shifting Taiwan's ex-
port markets from Japanese to mainland Chinese markets. Soon, how-
ever, Taiwan again had to shift its export markets to Japanese and other
international markets following the Communist victory on the mainland
and the establishment of the Nationalist government on Taiwan. 10 At
the same time, as a result of the termination of colonial ties to Japan,
Taiwan companies began domestic production of a number of essential
s Ranis, Industrial Development, in ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAI-
WAN 208 (W. Galenson ed. 1979) [hereinafter GROWTH IN TAIWAN].
9 Id. at 208-09. For an expanded discussion, incorporating political and social aspects of the
Japanese occupation period, see T. GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE 32-46
(1986).
10 Ranis, supra note 8, at 209. The main product for export at this point consisted of processed
foods, but capacity to export cement, paper and aluminum also existed. Id.
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consumer items, including textiles, leather goods, soaps and oils.1 As a
result of poor quality and high production costs, however, many of these
enterprises encountered difficulties not only in marketing products
abroad but also in competing domestically with Japanese products im-
ported to Taiwan.
12
C. The Import Substitution Period: 1949 to 1958
Confronting such obstacles, the Taiwan government began to adopt
a series of import substitution policies. In June 1949, the government
mandated surrendering foreign exchange earnings at the official rate. 3
As a result of a trade deficit and inflation, applications for foreign ex-
change soon exceeded available supply, and in December 1950, the gov-
ernment adopted a procedure to regulate foreign exchange applications
on the basis of the strength of domestic demand. 14 Then, in April 1951,
the authorities prohibited private transactions in gold and foreign ex-
change and severely restricted such transactions in exchange settlement
certificates ("ESCs").' 5
At the same time, officials introduced a multiple exchange rate to
govern both import payments and export receipts:
Imports of goods by the public sector, and of plant equipment and
important raw materials and intermediate inputs by the private sector, were
given a lower "official" rate; imports of other goods, including many fin-
ished consumer goods, were given a higher ESC rate. On the export side,
exchange earnings of public enterprises were given a lower rate and those of
private enterprises a higher rate.... During the early 1950s the exchange
rates were structured in a way that gave the most favorable treatment to the
importers of plant equipment and U.S.-aid-financed goods, followed by the
exporters of traditional goods, and importers of "ordinary" goods (mainly
finished consumer goods).
16
The effect of this multiple exchange rate system, of course, was the subsi-
dization of import-substituting industries by export industries.
1 id.
12 C. LIN, INDUSTRIALIZATION IN TAIWAN, 1946-72 43 (1973); S. Kuo, THE TAIWAN ECON-
OMY IN TRANSITION 297 (1983). For an expanded discussion of the period immediately following
World War II, incorporating political and social issues, see T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 47-55.
13 Exporters and other recipients of foreign exchange were required to sell their foreign-ex-
change earnings to the Bank of Taiwan at the official rate of NT$5 per U.S. dollar, receivable 20
percent in cash and 80 percent in exchange settlement certificates ("ESCs') of equivalent value.
These ESCs were freely negotiable in the market, or could be sold to the Bank of Taiwan at the
official rate. Importers applying for official foreign exchange were required to submit ESCs.
C. LIN, supra note 12, at 43.
14 Id. at 43-44.
15 Id. at 44.
16 Id. at 44-45. See also Liang & Liang, Trade and Incentive Policies in Taiwan, in EXPERIENCES
AND LESSONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN 221 (Li & Yu eds. 1982).
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The imposition of import controls constituted another tool of infant
industry promotion and protection in Taiwan. The following major com-
modities were placed under import control during this period of develop-
ment of import-substitution industries: 7
Table 1
Placed under control by
September 1949

























Placed under control between
September 1949 - 1955
Cotton yarn
Cotton piece goods, gray
Cotton piece goods, bleached or
dyed (all)
Woolen yam


















These products could be imported only with the approval of the trade
control authorities. Import controls were favored over tariff manipula-
tion for various reasons.
18
17 C. LIN, supra note 12, at 48. Import controls were applicable to part, but not all of the goods
under the categories marked with an asterisk.
18 See id. at 47-50. The choice of import controls over tariff manipulation probably resulted in
the bulk of the benefits of price increases in imports and import substitutes going into the pockets of
traders and domestic producers instead of being absorbed by the government in the form of fiscal
revenue. Id. at 50. The government's decision to strike the balance in favor of leaving more of the
benefits in the hands of a relatively inexperienced private industrial entrepreneurial class rather than
increasing government funds appears to have paid off. Another example during this period of the
government's faith in private initiative is the manner in which it established a number of industry-
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The government's import substitution policies yielded rapid results.
During the years from 1952 to 1957, the share of consumer goods in total
imports fell from 19.8% to 6.6%.19 During the same period, exports as a
fraction of gross domestic product ("GDP") rose only slightly, from
8.0% to 9.5%. 20 Total industrial production (which had only regained
its 1940 peak in 1951) doubled between 1951 and 1954, and import sub-
stitution was responsible for more than 90% of the sources of total mar-
ket demand between 1937 and 1954.21 Within the manufacturing
industry, the dominance of food processing gave way to a number of
primarily import substitution industries, such as textiles, rubber and
leather goods, wood products and bicycles.22 As might be expected in
this context, the overall trade orientation of the economy declined from
the pre-war period; this trend continued during the 1950s. 23 Ranis sum-
marized the basic purposes of the total policy package as 1) to capture
the foreign exchange resources necessary for public sector overhead con-
struction; 2) to maintain existing industry; and 3) to expand consumer
goods industries.24
By the mid-1950s, however, the negative consequences which econo-
mists commonly associate with a primary import substitution policy be-
gan to manifest themselves in Taiwan. Attainment of a high rate of
import substitution means that growth of domestic output depends
oriented technology and investment institutes to provide management training and technical assist-
ance along with credit for industrial entrepreneurs:
While the effort to provide such packages is a common phenomenon in developing coun-
tries, the concentration [in Taiwan] on usefulness to the private sector in areas of expanding
activity compares favorably with the "search for major break-throughs" approach to technol-
ogy financed by government subsidies frequently encountered elsewhere. In general, the gov-
ernment avoided the splashy "white elephant" route and seemed more interested in enhancing
the capacity of the infant entrepreneur to stand on his own feet-presumably the basic purpose
of erecting the primary import-substitution hothouse in the first place-rather than to force-
feed him continuously into the need for permanent protection from foreign and domestic
competition.
Ranis, supra note 8, at 215-17. Ranis also points out a number of other factors distinguishing Tai-
wan's import-substitution phase as a much milder version of the normal developing country stereo-
type. These include: 1) various measures taken to ensure the simultaneous vigorous growth of
agricultural activity; 2) relatively (by developing country standards) lower levels of protection by
way of tariffs and quantitative restrictions; 3) monetary policies (such as relatively high interest
rates) more favorable to the establishment of a relatively more competitive and efficient industrial
sector; and 4) a fairly general disinclination to resort at will to the whole range of direct allocative
devices (e.g., in the areas of steel, cement, fertilizer, etc.) often in evidence during periods of primary
import-substitution. Id. at 214-15.
19 Id. at 211.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 213; C. LIN, supra note 12, at 67.
22 Ranis, supra note 8, at 217-8.
23 Id. at 217.
24 Id. at 213.
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"mainly upon net increases in domestic demand."25 By the mid- to late-
1950s, the gradual exhaustion of the protected domestic market had be-
come apparent.26 At the same time, balance of payments deficits per-
sisted,27 and many of Taiwan's traditional and new manufactured export
products confronted a market glut. 8
Ranis suggests the following two possible responses at such a point
in a newly industrializing country's development: 1) actions "directed
toward the maintenance of growth in the more labor-intensive
nondurable consumer goods industries, to facilitate the shift from domes-
tic to export markets"; or 2) actions "directed toward a further expan-
sion of the more capital- and technology-intensive durable consumer and
capital goods industries, to induce secondary import substitution in other
areas of the domestic market."29 In Taiwan, policymakers attempted a
variety of responses. On the export promotion side, these included crea-
tion of a system of subsidies for a number of traditional exports in excess
supply, enlargement of the scope of export products benefiting from pref-
erential exchange rates, periodic exchange rate devaluation and develop-
ment of a system of tax rebates for industrial exports.30 At the same
25 C. LIN, supra note 12, at 68.
26 This exhaustion at the aggregate level exhibited itself by the bottoming out of the percent-
age of the total supply of nondurable consumer goods still being imported, a decline of the
growth rate of industrial output... and, at the micro level.., by a record of falling prices,
increased competitiveness, and businessmen's pressure for cartelization and other government
action to avoid bankruptcy.
Ranis, supra note 8, at 213. See also Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 221-23; C. UN, supra note 12,
at 70. Nor had growth of output in the intermediate goods and capital goods sectors picked up. Lin
attributes this to "the limitations of the small size of the domestic market and the sophisticated
nature of production technology required." Id This may be due, at least in part, to the fact that, in
contrast to other countries where adoption of import substitution policies tended to favor the rela-
tively large-scale and capital-intensive, 'Taiwan's manufacturing sector was already unusually labor-
intensive and decentralized." Ranis, supra note 8, at 218.
27 "Throughout the first half of the 1950s, deficits on goods and services amounted to as much as
35-64 percent of annual imports, reflecting the slow growth of exports and the continued large im-
ports of capital equipment and intermediate goods." C. LiN, supra note 12, at 70.
28 Id at 72-74.
29 Ranis, supra note 8, at 213.
30 In 1952 a total of 20 traditional export items then in a market glut were taken up for
government assistance, first by allowing the retention of foreign exchange earned by the export-
ers of those products and then by giving the exporters cash subsidies (although the cash system
was soon discontinued for want of funds.) Exchange rates applicable to private exporters and
inward remittances were raised several times during 1951-53 and then in 1955, by giving the
traders and other holders of foreign exchange certain ratios of negotiable foreign exchange cer-
tificates in addition to converting their foreign exchange earnings at the official rates.... In
1954 a system of tax rebates was introduced for reimbursing the manufacturers-cum-traders for
import duties paid on raw material used in the manufacturer of export products. In 1956 a
system of foreign exchange entitlements was introduced whereby these manufacturers-cum-
traders were to be entitled to certain proportions of their foreign exchange earnings for use in
importing raw materials.
C. LN, supra note 12, at 74. See also Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 223.
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time, a number of steps were taken which must be regarded as consistent
with maintaining an import substitution policy. These steps included the
organization of domestic cartels to resist price cutting, and a search for
new (and an expansion of old) secondary import substitution industries,
such as chemicals, rayon fiber, urea fertilizer, pre-vulcanized plastics and
compact cars.
3 1
D. Export Promotion: 1958 to Present
In 1958 the Taiwan government initiated a number of major policy
changes emphasizing exports. Some of these policies were aimed at re-
ducing the advantages of import substitution: 1) the multiple exchange
rate system was gradually dismantled as exchange rates were unified;
32
and 2) the budgeting and allocation of foreign exchange was rendered
more flexible through the gradual elimination of the system of commod-
ity-by-commodity foreign exchange allocation. 3 Other policies were
specifically designed to enhance export activity directly. Tax rebates ap-
plicable to industrial exports were extended and their governing rules
liberalized, and ratios of foreign exchange entitlements for industrial ex-
porters were raised to 100% of export earnings. A system of low-cost
export loans was also introduced in order to facilitate export financing.
34
Among the objectives of the nineteen-point reform program adopted
by the government in February 1960 were the promotion of measures
encouraging export expansion and the improvement of procedures gov-
erning the settlement of foreign exchange earned by exporters.35 The
Statute for Encouragement of Investment ("SEI"), enacted pursuant to
the nineteen-point reform program, contained a number of export en-
hancement provisions. These provisions included a deduction from taxa-
ble income of 2% of annual export proceeds within certain limits; an
exemption or reduction of the stamp tax in many cases, and an allowable
set-aside of 7% (to be regarded as profits before taxation) of the unpaid
balance of foreign currency debt calculated in local currency as a reserve
against possible losses caused by exchange rate revision. 6 The Income
Tax Law, as revised in December 1955, had already provided for certain
31 Ranis, supra note 8, at 219. For an expanded discussion, incorporating political and social
aspects of the import substitution period, see T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 56-73.
32 Ranis, supra note 8, at 219; Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 223-230. For a summary of the
steps taken between April 1958 and October 1963, see C. LIN, supra note 12, at 75-76.
33 Ranis, supra note 8, at 219-20. For a summary of the steps taken between April 1958 and
September 1959, see C. LIN, supra note 12, at 76.
34 C. LIN, supra note 12, at 76-7; see also Ranis, supra note 8, at 220.
35 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 300.
36 Id. at 301; Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 234.
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tax reductions, credits and holidays for qualified enterprises.37 The req-
uisite criteria for receipt of government approval for such credits in-
cluded the attainment of both import substitution and export expansion;
new entries could be added to the list of qualified enterprises provided at
least 50% of additional output was exported.38
In July 1954, the system of tax rebates, which had been used on a
limited basis since 1951 in Taiwan to facilitate importation of raw mater-
ials and their processing for export, was extended to cover all export
goods.39 Similarly, the scope of rebates was expanded from refunds only
of customs duties to include a variety of commodity taxes and other du-
ties accruing to manufactured goods.' The government also reduced or
liberalized over time the fees, time limits, and other conditions required
of exporters applying for tax rebates.41 Further, authorities allowed a
combination of the system of tax refunds with a system that offset tax
liabilities on exporting in lieu of actual collection of taxes, if the exporter
satisfied certain conditions.42
The system of foreign exchange control which the government de-
veloped in the'early 1950s and its role in enhancing import substitution
are described above.43 A system of foreign exchange retention, dating
from 1952, existed for Taiwan's traditional export items and private sec-
tor exports in general.' It was not until August 1956 that a system of
foreign exchange entitlements applicable more specifically to manufac-
tured goods was put in place. Under this system, "exporters of manufac-
tured goods were to be entitled to a certain percentage of their foreign-
exchange earnings for the purpose of importing the needed raw materials
approved by the authorities, or for selling to other end users."' 45 After
37 These incentives included a 10% reduction in payable income tax for qualified profit-seeking
enterprises and a three-year tax holiday for new investments or expansion of investments (resulting
in an increase of production by 30% or more) by such enterprises. The tax holiday was extended
from three to five years in September 1960. C. LIN, supra note 12, at 85.
38 Id. at 86.
39 Id. at 100-01.
40 These included the commodity tax and defense surtax beginning in 1955, the harbor charge in
1958, the salt tax in 1960, and the slaughter tax in 1964. Id. at 101.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 102-03.
43 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
44 The system, initially introduced for twenty traditional export items handled by private sector
traders then experiencing a market glut, was replaced in September 1952 by a system of cash subsi-
dies. The number of products receiving subsidies, however, was soon reduced as a result of a
shortage of funds. During the period from July 1953 to February 1955, export performance was
among the factors taken into account by authorities when screening private sector traders' import
exchange applications. C. LN, supra note 12, at 97.
45 Id.
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the 1958 foreign exchange reform, exchange entitlements were increased
to 100% of export earnings for most items.4 6 This system was coupled
with commodity import restrictions which had the effect of conferring a
cost advantage on exporters of manufactured goods as compared with
manufacturing firms catering only to the domestic market.47 As foreign
exchange supplies increased, the usefulness of the system of exchange
entitlement as a method for encouraging exports also gradually dimin-
ished, and it was abolished in January 1971. 48
In July 1957 the Bank of Taiwan initiated a system of low-cost ex-
port loans. The rates of interest were 6% per annum for loans repayable
in foreign currencies (increased to 7.5% in March 1962) and 11.88% per
annum for loans repayable in domestic currency. At that time, loans
available to private sector enterprises for general business purposes bore
interest at the rate of 19.8% for secured loans and 22.32% for unsecured
loans.49 Although the export loan program met the short-term fund
needs of manufacturers for export across the entire scope of their opera-
tions,5 0 since 1974 these loans never represented more than 2-3% of the
total loans outstanding in Taiwan."1
A major revision of the foreign exchange system occurred in No-
vember 1958, one which allowed ESCs to be applied to all kinds of im-
ports and exports.52 In the process of simplifying the multi-tiered foreign
exchange system first to a two-tiered system and then to a single ex-
change rate in 1961," 3 the price of ESCs came to be fixed at a level close
to the market price.54 The ESC system was eventually abolished and
replaced by the direct exchange settlement system now in effect.55 At the
same time, the New Taiwan dollar was devalued, thereby encouraging
46 Id. at 98.
47 An exporter of manufactured goods could apply for the import of required raw materials if
they were not produced domestically, or if the selling price of the equivalent domestic product ex-
ceeded 10% of CIF costs, whereas manufacturing firms producing for the domestic market could
apply to import a product only if the selling price of the domestic product exceeded a certain per-
centage (25% prior to 1964, 15% from 1964 to 1968, 10% after 1968) of the duty-paid import costs.
Id at 98-100.
48 Id. at 100.
49 Id at 105.
so Id. at 105-06.
51 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 303-04.
52 Id. at 298.
53 Sun & Lee, Economic Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan With Special Reference
to ROC-US Trade and Investment Relations, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN 60-61 (H. Ma
ed. 1985) [hereinafter TRADE AND INVESTMENT].
54 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 298-99.





During this period, revision of import duties and reduction of im-
port restrictions also evidenced movement toward liberalization of dis-
cretionary controls. In 1955, tariff rates were raised on both finished
goods and intermediate inputs for many products.5 7 This trend was re-
versed in 1959, however, when tariff rates were reduced for a number of
finished goods as well as their principal imported inputs and in 1965,
when tariff rates were reduced on a number of important manufactures.5 8
As a result of the imposition of a defense surtax and harbor charges,
however,59 the rates of total import duties on a number of goods were
substantially higher than their tariff rates would suggest. Thus, during
the 1960s, the remission of taxes and duties became increasingly impor-
tant to the promotion of export manufacture.' At the same time that
import duties were under revision, the conditions for import restriction
were gradually tightened during the 1960s. 1
In addition to the government's foreign exchange, trade, and finan-
cial policies just described, two other developments affecting export
growth warrant some attention. First, several manufacturing sectors or-
ganized during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s to regulate out-
put and to promote export sales through a system of mutual subsidies.62
56 Id "From the beginning of 1958 to the middle of 1959, the NT$ was devalued, depending on
the type of transaction, by 50-80 percent." S. Ho, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN, 1860-
1970, at 196 (1978).
57 C. LN, supra note 12, at 87.
58 Id at 87-88; see Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 230-31.
59 These charges evolved in such a way as to provide further incentives for exports. From April
1958 until July 1968, the defense surtax was 20% on the customs tariff of all imported goods; then a
variable rate structure was adapted as follows: 20% on raw materials for use in the manufacturing
of export goods (to be written off at the time of exporting the finished goods); 26% on plant equip-
ment, scientific and medical instruments and equipment, and daily essentials; and 30% on all other
goods. An additional 20% surtax was temporarily collected on goods used for consumption pur-
poses between May 1962 and June 1963. C. LIN, supra note 12, at 88. In November 1958, the
harbor charge on traded goods (which had been collected at 2% each on the duty-paying value of
both imports and exports) was eliminated on exports and increased to 3% on imports. In August
1967, an additional 0.75% was levied on imports for a period of 10 years. Id
60 Id at 90.
61 Id at 90-95; Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 231-33. According to Kuo's analysis, "when
manufactured products are classified into four categories--export competing, export-import compet-
ing, import competing and non-import competing... the highest rate of protection [during 1961-
1971] was extended to export competing industries." S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 303-05.
62 These sectoral associations function by collecting from their member firms an agreed
amount for a so-called cooperative fund. The fund thus established is used to pay out an agreed
amount of so-called export bonuses to the exporters of finished goods. Each firm is allocated an
export quota in proportion to its output, and is required to pay a penalty to the cooperative fund
if its export sales fall short. The exact amount of the agreements signed between the firms must
be submitted for approval by the proper government agencies.
C. LN, supra note 12, at 108. See also Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 234.
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Manufacturers of various products formed such cartels, including manu-
facturers of cotton textiles, paper, steel products, rubber manufactures,
monosodium glutamate, cement, and woolen textiles.63 Their penalties
on domestic sales and encouragement of export sales thus supplemented
the various government-administered export incentives. Second, the gov-
ernment in January 1965 enacted a statute for establishing export
processing zones ("EPZs"). In addition to receiving the benefit of all
export incentives otherwise available, plants in the zones had
access to well-developed plant sites or factory buildings, water and power
supply, and harbor or warehouse facilities at costs comparable to or much
lower than those available in other parts of the Far East, as well as enjoying
a remarkable cutback in the red tape associated with applications for and
licensing of investment, plant establishment, export, import, inward and
outward remittances. 64
Plants in the zones also effectively received more favorable import duty
treatment than plants located elsewhere in Taiwan.65
The government's export incentive policies, (in combination with
Taiwan's competitive labor supply, the continuation of sustained steady
advances in the agricultural sector, and the contributions of foreign in-
vestment) yielded significant results:
[B]etween 1962 and 1972 exports of goods and services rose from 13 to
nearly 43% of GDP and the share of industrial products-primarily
nondurable consumer goods-in these exports increased from 50 to
83%.... By the end of the decade, Taiwan's export ratio was one of the
highest on record, and the shift in the composition of exports certainly one
of the most spectacular. During this period, imported raw-material-based
industries (such as textiles, leather and wood products) dramatically in-
creased their importance relative to domestic raw-material-based
industries.... 66
From 1961 to 1971, exports grew at a 22% annual rate in real terms.67
In spite of the challenge posed by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979-
63 C. LIN, supra note 12, at 109.
64 Id. at 107.
65 Id. For brief descriptions of zone development, see id at 107-08; S. Ho, supra note 56, at 197-
98; Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 234-35; Ranis, supra note 8, at 237-39.
Developed country customers, such as the United States, in turn, by permitting the waiver of
tariffs upon reentry on all but the value added portion of the product, provided additional
encouragement for this new form of international subcontracting by process. Moreover, mul-
tinational companies became heavily... involved in this type of industrial activity and thus,
given the enhanced flexibility for intrafirm pricing and profit location decisions, provided it with
additional cost-reducing advantages."
Id. at 239.
66 Id. at 221; see also Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 235-40.
67 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 315. For an expanded discussion, incorporating political and social
aspects of the export orientation period from 1960 to 1973, see T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 74-96.
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1980,68 the fact that exports continued to grow at an annual rate of
19.2% in real terms during the decade from 1971 to 198169 suggests that
the basic export orientation of Taiwan's economy remained intact. At
the same time that a variety of significant import liberalization policies
were gradually introduced, 7° a real effective exchange rate favorable to
foreign trade was maintained from 1976 to 1981.71 Although a number
of trends in the late 1970's indicated that Taiwan's industrial sector was
entering a period of secondary import substitution, 72 its high export ra-
tios73 and underlying support system have been maintained.
III. THE PRESENT FORMULATION OF TAIwAN's LAW AND
REGULATION AFFECTING PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT
The structure of Taiwan's law and regulation which has evolved
since 1958 to facilitate exports includes relevant provisions in the areas of
taxation, customs duties, financing, pricing, and labor.
68 For accounts of Taiwan's response to these shocks to its economy, see Ranis, supra note 8, at
255-260; S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 199-221.
69 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 315.
70 For example, import duties were reduced during the first half of 1972 for fifteen categories of
import goods. C. LIN, supra note 12, at 188. This trend continued, when the tariff rate adjustment
in 1974 lowered the tariff on 200 import items (while raising the tariff on only seven items). S. Kuo,
supra note 12, at 214. In spite of these adjustments, however, rates remained relatively high; in 1981,
tariffs still comprised 19% of government tax revenue. Id at 318. In addition, financial costs of
importers were reduced "through increased provision for foreign-exchange loans, reduction in inter-
est charges for such loans, and reduction in the proportion of performance bond required for import-
ing plants and equipment by installment payments." C. LIN, supra note 12, at 188. To a limited
extent, export incentives were also reduced during the period:
A program under which exporters could borrow for working capital against a credit line
based on their previous year's trade performance was discontinued in January 1974. Pre-ship-
ment preferential export credit to finance working capital needs is currently available only with
[Letter of Credit] backing. Furthermore, stricter rules were applied to rebates on customs
duties.
Liang & Liang, supra note 16, at 242.
71 S. Kuo, supra note 12, at 306-08.
72 These trends included: 1) a gradual increase in the relative size of domestic intermediate and
capital goods industries; 2) some domestic activity (in terms of raw materials utilized and sales) by
the EPZs; and 3) growth of the public sector's role in the economy. Ranis, supra note 8, at 258-60.
73 Exports have constituted more than 50% of Taiwan's GDP every year since 1978. DIREC-
TORATE GENERAL OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICS, EXECUTIVE YUAN, QUARTERLY
EcONOMIC TRENDS IN TAIWAN AREA, THE ROC (August 1986). Taiwan's 1986 foreign trade
totaled $63.9 billion, up 25.8% over 1985; of this amount, $39.78 billion was for exports (a 29.5%
increase over 1985) and $24.17 billion was for imports (a 20.3% increase over 1985). Taiwan Inter-
national Trade 89 (March 1987). For an expanded discussion, incorporating political and social
aspects of the post-oil crisis period, see T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 97-121; Liang & Liang, supra note
16, at 240-48.
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A. Taxation
In recent years the standard income tax rates for profit-seeking en-
terprises' in Taiwan has been 30 and 35% of annual taxable income.75
However, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment ("SEI") provides
for two preferential income tax rate ceilings relevant to exporters. First,
if a firm qualifies as a "productive enterprise" for purposes of the SEI,7 6
its income tax (including surcharges) shall not exceed 25% of its annual
taxable income.77 Second, the statute also permits "venture capital in-
vestment enterprises, big trading companies78 and basic metal production
74 The term "profit-seeking enterprise" as used in the Statute for Encouragement of Investment,
as amended through January 26, 1987 ("SEI"), refers to "any public-operated, private, or joint or-
ganization with a business name or place engaged in industry, commerce, agriculture, forestry, fish-
ery, pasturage, mining, metallurgical operation or other activity for profit-seeking purposes, and
organized in the form of sole proprietorship, partnership, company, or in any other form of organi-
zation." SEI art. 4. For a general discussion of taxation of domestic business enterprises, partner-
ships and other business entities, see Wang, Taxation of Income in the Republic of China, in TRADE
AND INVESTMENT, supra note 53.
75 The statute for income tax rates is adjusted every year by the legislature to fix the tax rates for
the coming fiscal year. Id. at 331. The 1985 rate on taxable business income in excess of $500,000
was 30%. Id. at 341.
76 The term "productive enterprise" as used in the SEI refers to any one of a number of de-
scribed types of operation "which produces goods and/or renders services, and which is organized as
a company limited by shares in accordance with [Taiwan's] Company Law." SEI, art. 3. The types
of operations included are manufacturing, handicraft, mining, agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal
husbandry, transportation, warehousing, public utility, public facility construction and development,
public housing construction, technical services, hotels and heavy machinery construction. The re-
spective categories and criteria of encouragement for the different operations are to be prescribed
and promulgated by the Executive Yuan. IaM The Executive Yuan has carried out this mandate by
issuing a 107-page CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA OF PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES ELIGIBLE FOR
ENCOURAGEMENT.
77 SEI, art. 15.
78 Since 1978, six large trading companies have been established under government guidance.
Wang, supra, note 74. According to standards published by the Board of Foreign Trade ("BOFT")
in early 1987, in order to be officially reorganized is a large trading company, a company must have
an annual import/export volume of $125 million. In addition, it should have NT$200 million in
paid-in capital and more than three foreign branch offices, and must be a limited company. China
Post, Feb. 9, 1987, at 7, col. 1. Application for large trading company status must be submitted to
the BOFT, and the company's export volumes must be validated by the tax collection office, while
import volumes must be substantiated by Customs. Id. The required import/export volume has not
remained static at $125 million; in order to qualify as a big trader, a company's annual transactions
must reach a certain level, which moves up in proportion to the country's overall trade growth.
Designated big traders are disqualified when they cannot keep pace with the country's trade growth.
As a result, only three (Collins Co., E-Hsin International Corp., and Pan Overseas Corp.) of the six
originally-designated big traders still qualified in 1987. Taiwan International Trade 81 (June 1987);
China News, June 20, 1987, at 8, col. 7. In addition to being allowed to take a 5% deduction in
business taxes, a big trader is also allowed to get easy loans from banks totaling 2.5 times the amount
of its capital. Id. col. 8. To reverse the diminution in the number of companies qualifying for "big
trading company" status, the Board of Foreign Trade promulgated a number of revisions in July
1987. These included: lowering the minimum required annual business turnover from NT$200 mil-
lion to NT$100 million, lowering required paid-in capital from NT$200 million to NT$150 million,
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industries, heavy machinery industries, petrochemical industries or other
important productive enterprises which conform with the needs for de-
velopment of economic and national defense industries and are capital-
intensive and/or technology-intensive in nature" to use a marginal tax
rate of no more than 20%. 79
In addition to preferential income tax rate ceilings, the Statute for
Encouragement of Investment also establishes a variety of tax holidays
and an accelerated depreciation schedule. A newly established produc-
tive enterprise may select one of the following benefits: 1) a tax holiday of
up to five years, provided that the company depreciates its assets accord-
ing to Taiwan's Service Life of Fixed assets;80 or 2) accelerated deprecia-
tion on the service life of fixed assets.8 In addition, expanding
enterprises may select a tax holiday of up to four years on the income
derived from increased capacity, provided that the company depreciates
its assets according to Taiwan's Service Life of Fixed Assets,82 or acceler-
ated depreciation of the newly purchased equipment beginning in the
year in which the machines begin operation.83
The Statute for Encouragement of Investment also authorizes the
Executive Yuan to permit a productive enterprise to credit 5 to 20% of
the amount invested in production equipment during a tax year against
the income tax payable for that tax year.84 In the event that the income
repealing the foreign branch office requirement, and allowing the previous year's top 10 trading
companies to acquire big trading company status. China Post, July 16, 1987, at 7, col. 3-4.
79 SEI, art. 15. Prior to the 1987 amendment of the statute, the rates were 25% for big trading
companies and venture capital investment enterprises and 22% for the other designated industries to
be encouraged.
80 SEI, art. 6.
81 If the service life of machinery and/or equipment is 10 years or more, it may be accelerated to
5 years; if it is less than 10 years, it may be accelerated by half; if the residual period after the
acceleration is less than one year, the residual period shall not be counted. The prescribed service
life of buildings, construction facilities, and communication and transport facilities may be acceler-
ated by one-third; the residual period after the acceleration is less than one year, the residual period
shall not be counted. If there is any undepreciated value during the accelerated service life, it may
continue to be depreciated in one year or in several years within the prescribed service life until it is
fully depreciated. Id
82 The exemption is limited to the increase of capital for additional establishment of independent
production or service units, or for expansion of major production or service equipment. Id.
83 I d
84 SEI, art. 10. The Executive Yuan promulgated its Measures Governing the Application for
Tax Deduction for Investment in Procurement of Machinery and Equipment by Private Production
Enterprises by decree of June 29, 1985. The measures applied to purchases with a total cost in excess
of NT$600,000 and provided for deductions in the amount of 15% of the purchase price if purchased
from domestic manufacturers and 5% if purchased from foreign suppliers. Id. art. 2. A March 1987
report by the Industrial Development Bureau indicated that since July 1985, when the investment
tax credit program was implemented, total capital exceeded NT$66 billion, resulting in NT$4.2
billion in tax savings. China Post, Mar. 19, 1987, at 7, col. 3. However, in April 1987 the Finance
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tax payable for the current year is less than the credit amount, the enter-
prise may credit the balance against its income tax in the ensuing five
years.8 5
The Statute for Encouragement of Investment also allows produc-
tive enterprises to set aside a reserve of up to 1% of the previous year's
amount of export exchange settlement, to be used exclusively for com-
pensating export losses actually incurred for the current year.8 6 The re-
serve is treated as a deduction from taxable income and is identified as a
liability on company accounts. Should a company's export loss reserve
exceed 1% during the tax year, excess funds are carried forward as taxa-
ble income in the subsequent year.
Taiwan implemented a value-added tax ("VAT") system on April 1,
1986, pursuant to which a tax is collected from the purchaser at a fiat
rate of 5% on the value which has been added to a product at each stage
of production or distribution.87 However, exporters and a variety of en-
terprises related to the export trade pay VAT at a zero tax rate.8  All
previous VAT paid may be refunded, provided that the exporter provides
all export documentation and documentation of purchases and approved
expenses.8 9 VAT is also applied to all imported goods except those im-
Ministry announced that it had decided to scrap the investment tax rebate system after its expiration
at the end of June, 1987. China News, Apr. 20, 1987, at 2, col. 7. The decision was based on a
ministry survey of more than one thousand local manufacturers revealing that the tax rebate had not
been a decisive factor in their investment plans and had not been as effective in stimulating private
investment as expected. Id. The ministry reported, however, that it would work out new regulations
governing tax rebates for local manufacturers who make investments in pollution control programs.
Id. The Industrial Development Bureau soon responded, taking the position that the tax credit
program had been of great assistance in the upgrading of productivity and quality, and should be
further extended. China Post, May 11, 1987, at 7, col. 1. Just prior to the scheduled expiration of
the investment tax credit, a compromise was reached whereby the Finance Ministry agreed to pro-
long the measure for one more year and the Ministry of Economic Affairs agreed not to expand the
list of eligible machinery and equipment. China Post, June 20, 1987, at 7, col. 2.
85 The amount of tax credit in each ensuing year (except for the last year) cannot exceed 50% of
the amount of income tax payable by the enterprise in the then current year. China Post, June 20,
1987, at 7, col. 2.
86 SEI, art. 31.
87 J. CHENG, DOING BUSINESS IN TAIWAN 1986, 62 (1986). Although most businesses are sub-
ject to the VAT system, financial institutions, special food and drink establishments and small busi-
nesses instead pay tax on monthly gross business receipts. Id.
88 Zero tax rate enterprises include: 1) export of goods; 2) services related to exports or services
offered within the territory of Taiwan but used in foreign countries; 3) goods sold to outbound or
transit passengers by lawfully established tax free shops; 4) sale of machinery and equipment, mate-
rial, supplies, fuel and unfinished goods to export enterprises inside the duty free export processing
zones, enterprises inside the science-based industrial park, or to bonded factories or bonded ware-
houses supervised by the customs house; 5) international transportation; 6) vessels and aircraft used
in international and deep sea fishing; and 7) sales of goods and maintenance services to vessels and
aircraft used for international transportation and deep sea fishing. Id at 62-63.
89 Id at 62.
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ported into the science-based industrial park, government-approved tax
free export zones, and bonded factories or warehouses, and to goods de-
livered from such enterprises, factories or warehouses into other areas in
Taiwan.90 Prior to implementation of the VAT and its zero tax rate for
exporters, comparable benefits existed with respect to Taiwan's business
and stamp taxes.91
Harbor taxes have been levied at a rate of 1% to 4% on the duty-
paying value of all dutiable import goods. Export products have been
exempted, and the tax can be offset or refunded for imported raw materi-
als used in the manufacture of goods for export.92 In early 1987, the
Ministry of Finance proposed changing the harbor fee to 1% for imports
and to 0.5% of FOB prices for exports and eliminating the right to re-
ceive rebates of fees collected on imports processed for eventual export.9 3
90 Id. at 64.
91 The authorities in Taiwan levied a business tax on selling goods, rendering services or other
profit seeking activities within the territory of Taiwan. Article 29 of the SEI exempted export sales
(including sales to trading companies and to manufacturers for further processing before export)
from the business tax. The amount of the exemption equaled the amount of business tax due on each
sale destined for export. Companies paid the business tax monthly and received exemptions for
export at that time. However, if the export remained unconfirmed at the time the taxes were due, or,
if goods were sold to trading companies or to other manufacturers for further processing before
export, companies initially reported the sale as a domestic sale, then applied for the business tax
exemptions at the time of export. Such exemptions took the form of a rebate of taxes paid. Article
29 of the SEI was deleted, effective January 26, 1987, as a result of the implementation of the new
business law and VAT law. Econ. News, Mar. 9-15, 1987, at 4, col. 4.
The authorities on Taiwan levied a stamp tax of 0.4% on sales invoices. Article 33 of the SEI
permitted reduction of the stamp tax to 0.1% for all invoices issued by a profit-seeking enterprise for
transactions exempted from the business tax by Article 29 of the SEI. Article 33 of the SEI was
deleted at the same time as Article 29 for the same reasons. Id.
92 J. CHENG, supra note 87, at 62; China Post, Mar. 18, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
93 Id. The evolution of this proposal is an example of how difficult it has been to resolve some of
the trade tensions between the United States and Taiwan. In the course of the October 1985 consul-
tations between the American Institute in Taiwan ("AlT") and Taiwan's Coordination Council for
North American Affairs ("CCNAA"), AIT asked Taiwan to cut the harbor tax rate and apply it to
both imports and exports. Econ. News, Nov. 24-30, 1986, at 5, col. 2. In August 1986 CCNAA
indicated that Taiwan would consider restructuring the harbor tax. Id. at col. 2-3. The United
States has reportedly protested the Finance Ministry's proposal as violating the spirit of the parties'
understanding that port surcharges would "be levied on those who use the ports, meaning both
imports and exports." China News, Mar. 19, 1987, at 2, col. 5. The United States reportedly has
expressed the opinion that levying a lighter surcharge on exports is tantamount to encouraging ex-
ports to the United States and demanded that port surcharges should be the same for exports and
imports. Id. The Finance Ministry based its argument on the fact that no port surcharge has been
imposed on exports for the past 20 years and the sudden addition of a charge would put exporters at
a disadvantage against foreign competition. Iad col. 5-6. The Economics Ministry, on the other
hand, recommended a fee of 0.5% for both exports and imports, reflecting the differing perspectives
of the two ministries. Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development noted that the
Finance Ministry's proposal might still dissatisfy the United States because of its different rates for
imports and exports and "suggested that the government set the same rates for imports and exports
in compliance with the principle of fair trade." China News, Mar. 23, 1987, at 2, col. 8. Even the
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A commodity tax system also exists in Taiwan. This tax is a one-
time tax payable regardless of whether the article is imported or manu-
factured locally; it is levied against the domestic manufacturer, or the
holder of the article in the case of an imported item (assessed at the time
of import).94 The tax is computed according to a formula incorporating
tax rates ranging from 2% for natural gas to 100% for certain cosmet-
Finance Ministry's proposal, however, caused concern in the export industry. In a meeting with
Finance Minister Chien on March 23, 1987, a group of industry representatives led by the chairman
of the Chinese National Federation of Industries pointed out that the NT dollar's gains against the
United States dollar had already dampened local industry competitiveness and that the proposed
levy would add to exporters' burdens and further cut their competitive edge in the world market.
Finance Minister Chien, in response, cited U.S. complaints about the current levy system and said
that if the fee were dropped altogether, as some had suggested, the government could suffer loss of
revenues. He concluded that the Finance Ministry needed more time to make an overall review of
all the problems before making a final decision. China News, Mar. 24, 1987, at 8, cols. 4-5. In May
1987, it was reported that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Communications had reached
consensus on harbor fees, with the Communications Ministry to submit a proposed amendment
stipulating that all export items would be subject to the harbor construction fee at a rate not to
exceed 4% of a product's export value; a ranking official noted that "the actual rate [would] not
exceed 1% even though the upper limit is set at 4%." China Post, May 9, 1987, at 7, col. 1. At a
symposium shortly thereafter sponsored by the Importers and Exporters Association of Taipei (in-
cluding importers, exporters, and representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commu-
nications, Board of Foreign Trade, Industrial Development Bureau, and Legislative Yuan), the
participants found that the tax for harbor construction had reached NT$14.8 billion in 1986, only
25% of which was actually used for harbor construction; they also noted that the fee, combined with
an appreciating NT dollar, was causing serious problems for manufacturers and exporters. The
symposium resulted in a consensus against calling the tax a "harbor construction fee" and suggesting
that it be suspended or lowered to 0.5% of the import or export value. China Post, May 23, 1987, at
7, col. 2. The Executive Yuan at the end of May approved and submitted to the Legislative Yuan an
amendment lowering the ceiling from 4% to 2% and also subjecting exports to the levies. It was
simultaneously reported that the government had tentatively set rates of 1% for imports and 0.5%
for exports at the initial stage of enforcement of the revised law and had decided to freeze annual
revenues at the amount of NT$14.6 billion then projected for 1987 (meaning that rates for both
imports and exports could be lowered if import-export quantities increased). China News, May 29,
1987, at 8, col. 1. Shortly thereafter, the Finance Ministry instructed the Inspectorate General of
Customs to review the list of items not subjected to port charges (among them, industrial and agri-
cultural products and raw materials for the export processing zones, science industrial park and
bonded factories) in an effort to reduce the number of items exempt. Officials said that except for
those that still must enjoy such privilege because of military and diplomatic considerations, all com-
mercial items should be subjected to port surcharges in the future; to avoid "double taxation," how-
ever, the Finance Ministry was considering giving rebates on the charges for export products of
which the raw materials had already been subjected to port surcharges during importation. China
News, June 8, 1987, at 12, cols. 1-2.
In July, the Legislative Yuan gave final approval to a revision of Article 7 of the Commercial
Harbor Law limiting the harbor construction tax to no more than 1% of the value of imported and
exported goods. The revision reserved discretion to the Executive Yuan to reduce or revoke the tax
on the basis of policy needs and further expressly limited the use of the tax to construction of com-
mercial harbors and related facilities. China Post, July 17, 1987, at 7, col. 3-4. In August, the
Executive Yuan exercised its discretion to set the fee at a rate of 0.5% of the value of both imported
and exported commodities. China Post, Aug. 4, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
94 J. CHENG, supra note 87, at 64-65.
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ics.9" However, export goods are exempted, and commodity tax paid on
exported goods or raw materials used for exported goods will be re-
funded or offset.96
B. Customs Duties
Productive enterprises are allowed to pay import duties and dues on
selected capital equipment in a series of installments beginning one year
from the date the equipment begins to produce goods or to render serv-
ices.97 For machinery and equipment imported by qualified corporations
designated as important for economic or technological development and
producing items only for export, the customs duties may be deferred for
five years. 98 In addition, qualified enterprises are exempted from import
95 Id at 65-66.
96 Id at 66. The significance of the export exemption may diminish in the future, inasmuch as
the Finance Ministry is contemplating narrowing the scope of the commodity tax as its next step in
rationalizing Taiwan's business tax following the successful introduction of the value-added tax.
China News, Mar. 23, 1987, at 8, col. 8. Changes under consideration would remove daily necessi-
ties and raw materials from the list of goods subject to commodity taxes and subject only the follow-
ing categories of commodities to the tax: 1) vehicles and energy; 2) commodities that might cause
pollution; 3) luxury items; and 4) tobacco, wines and commodities that might affect health. Id
Prior to the enactment of VAT, the authorities abolished the commodity tax on plastics, leather and
leather boots, paper products and steel round bars, and made those items eligible for the VAT.
China Post, Mar. 30, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
97 SEI, art. 21. The qualifying imports are defined as consisting of "machinery or equipment for
use by the enterprise for production of goods or rendition of services... [and] component parts and
materials specifically needed for manufacture of the said machinery and equipment, which are not
yet domestically manufactured ...... Ia The term "machinery and equipment" is defined as "ma-
chinery and equipment needed in the process of the manufacture and production of goods in a
factory and inspection apparatus necessary for quality control, equipment necessary for the preven-
tion of pollution, equipment attached to machinery and equipment for industrial safety and equip-
ment necessary for loading, unloading, piling and transporting purposes within the factory area."
Enforcement Rules of the SEI, art. 38.1. The term "component parts and materials" is defined as,
"the component parts and materials needed for manufacture of the aforesaid machinery and equip-
ment and materials necessary for framing, fixing, supporting, or hanging the said machinery and
equipment or specific amount of catalyst or accelerator necessary for installation of units of machin-
ery and equipment, but not including materials of a consuming nature and indirect materials." Id.,
art. 38.2. Determination and recognition of "machinery or equipment which are not yet domesti-
cally manufactured" shall be made "on the basis of individual items of machinery and equipment,
which are not interrelated, of the complete set of machinery and equipment required for the entire
production system or on the basis of individual items of the component parts and materials, which
are not interrelated, needed for manufacture of the said machinery and equipment." Id. art. 38.3.
In the case of "component parts and materials" imports, "approval of the authority-in-charge of
the enterprise" is required. Id. The enterprise must in all cases furnish a guarantee to be eligible for
installment payments. Ia For a general discussion of import procedures and customs procedures
relating to imports, see Pan and Huang, Export-Import Procedures and Regulations Applicable to
Foreign Trade in the Republic of China, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 53, at 693-715,
725-27.
98 Customs Law, art. 27. The corporation must be limited by shares and organized in accord-
ance with the Company Law. Ia The Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the Ministry of
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duties on selected capital equipment used for the establishment or expan-
sion of an approved project,9 9 or for research and development.." Capi-
tal equipment may also be imported on a duty-free basis into Taiwan's
Export Processing Zones and the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park,
as long as it remains there.1"1
Imported raw materials to be used for processing articles for export
within one year are exempted from customs."0 2 Customs duty paid on
raw materials for use in the manufacture of articles for export may be
refunded after exportation of the finished products. 10 3 Raw materials
may also be imported on a duty-free basis into the Export Processing
Zones and the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park," 0 as well as
bonded warehouses and factories,10 5 if they are processed for re-export.
Economic Affairs, is charged with determining the categories of industrial enterprises regarded as
having important bearings on economic development or involving highly sophisticated technology.
Id. The import duty and taxes are recorded on account against a guaranty for a period of five years
starting from the date of importation and are payable upon expiration of the five year period. Iad
Original authorization of the five-year recording period will be revoked and the duty recorded on
account collected in the event the enterprise either 1) fails to export all of its products or 2) transfers
the items imported to others in a form of lease, resale or by any other means. Id, art. 27-1.
99 SEI, art. 21. Qualified enterprises include "industrial, mining, or other operations conforming
to the criteria established by the Executive Yuan." Id. Arts. 20-21. The statute provides for reas-
sessment of import duties or dues originally exempted if within five years of import the enterprise
involved reduces its capital or transfers the subject machinery, equipment, components, parts or
materials to others, unless the transfer is made to a like enterprise. Id., art. 21.
100 SEI, art. 21. The exemption applies to a productive enterprise's import of "instruments and
equipment exclusively for research, development, experiment or quality inspection services, of which
domestically manufactured items are unavailable, for use in development of new products, improve-
ment of quality, conservation of energy, prevention of public pollution, promotion of utilization of
wastes, or improvement of manufacturing method." Id. In accordance with Article 21 of the SEI,
the Ministry of Finance has prescribed Enforcement Rules Governing the Payment in Installments
of and Exemption from Duties and Dues Leviable on Machinery and Equipment Imported by Pro-
ductive Enterprises.
101 Wang, supra note 78, at 125.
102 Customs Law, art. 32. With some exceptions, if the raw material is not exported in finished
goods within the prescribed time limit, the duty on the raw material must be paid together with a
"delinquent fee" of 0.05% per day from the day of importation. See Customs Law, art. 16.
103 Id., Arts. 32, 36. Refunds are to be made in accordance with the Executive Yuan's Regula-
tions Governing the Offsetting or Refund of Duties and Taxes on the Raw Materials of Export
Products. Duty drawback is given on certain imported materials used to produce certain export
products, according to criteria determined and approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Duty
drawback is refunded on a shipment-by-shipment basis and is calculated by applying a pre-estab-
lished duty drawback rate to the cut weight of the finished product in each export shipment. The
duty drawback rate is approved by the Taiwan authorities for each export product based on raw
material usage and production yield data submitted by manufacturers of the export product. Id,
Arts. 6-7.
104 Wang, supra note 78, at 125.
105 Customs Law, art. 35. Regulations governing the establishment and control of bonded ware-




The Export Loan Discount Regulations of the Central Bank of
China permit registered exporters in possession of a letter of credit to
apply for low-cost export loans covering up to 85% of the value of the
export transaction. Authorized commercial foreign currency banks ar-
range export loans at normal commercial rates; then the lender may ap-
ply for an interest rate reduction from the Central Bank. If the Central
Bank approves the reduction, the commercial bank correspondingly
reduces the lending rate to the exporter. Exporters must settle the loan
with foreign exchange within 180 days or pay an interest rate penalty on
the full amount of the loan. 106
The Executive Yuan possesses authority to establish and to adminis-
ter a special development fund to promote investments of interest to na-
tional economic development. 107 Disbursements may be made from the
fund for the following purposes:
(1) For sole investments in important productive enterprises, as in-
cluded in the economic development plans, which are beyond the capability
of private investors or of no interest to private investors;
(2) For joint investments in technology-intensive and important en-
terprises, as included in the economic development plans, which are pro-
moted by private investors with insufficient capital;
(3) For financing a technology-intensive and important enterprise, as
included in the economic development plans, which requires the purchase
of machinery and equipment for own use but without sufficient capital; or
(4) In order to upgrade and improve the technology of a productive
enterprise, the organization which manages the development fund may util-
ize the fund to finance the introduction of special technology, patent or
advanced design. 108
D. Pricing
Taiwan maintains a number of state-owned industries.109 There is
some evidence that state-owned industries maintain pricing policies
106 Export Loan Discount Regulations of the Central Bank of China. The Central Bank sets the
maximum and minimum interest rates for commercial lending in Taiwan. Export loans are custom-
arily set at rates equal to or below the minimum rates established for commercial lending. See 51
Fed. Reg. 19,584 (1986).
107 SEI, art. 84.
108 Id.
109 Among the state-owned companies are the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, China Steel Cor-
poration, Taiwan Fertilizer Co., Taiwan Salt Works, China Petrochemical Development Corp., Tai-
wan Sugar Corp., Taiwan Power Co., Taiwan Aluminum Corp. and Taiwan Metal Mining Corp. As
in many other countries, considerable attention is being given to the privatization of at least some of
the government-run firms. See, eg., State Firms Going Public Could Stabilize Stocks, China News,
Apr. 23, 1987, at 8.
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designed to favor downstream purchaser-manufacturers who produce
primarily for export. For example, China Steel Corporation ("CSC"), a
supplier of pipe and tube inputs to downstream Taiwan manufacturers,
follows a two-tiered pricing policy. The first-tier price applies to domes-
tic producers who manufacture goods for the Taiwan market. It is based
on the landed, duty-paid price of imported hot-rolled coil. CSC offers
the second-tier price to manufacturers who purchase coil to produce ex-
port products. That price is based on the landed duty-free price of hot-
rolled coil. 110
E. Labor
Taiwan has utilized a number of forms of labor training, including
vocational training centers:"' "Shipbuilding trainees, for example, typi-
110 The rationale for this two-tiered pricing policy is as follows:
CSC's pricing policy is to structure its domestic prices based on the prices which it can obtain
on the open market overseas. When customers use imported steel for their exported products,
they may obtain duty drawback from the government. Therefore CSC must compete with im-
ported steel on a duty-free basis, and set its price for any one product at the level no higher than
the average of the F.O.B. Taiwan export prices it can obtain for the same product. For steel
consumed for domestically sold products, CSC adds an amount, which is less than the duty for
that steel, thus taking only partial advantage of tariff protection.
M. KING, THE CREATION AND BUILDING-UP OF CHINA STEEL CORPORATION 11. Unlike the
situation in many developing countries where creation of steelmaking capacity has "as much to do
with nationalism and industrial prestige as economic growth," Global Overcapacity Plagues Indus-
tries, Asian Wall Street J., Mar. 13-14, 1987, at 22, col. 3 (Asian ed.), the creation of China Steel
Corporation "was purely in the interest of the steel consumers who take in steel as their primary
material for their operations, to relieve them from the mercy of foreign steel makers during shortages
(which did occur in 1974, and near shortages occurred in the third quarter of 1980, and the fourth
quarter of 1983), and to make available close-by sources with the advantage that inventory can be
kept delivery at low level." M. KING, supra at 4. Recent domestic/export shipment ratios support
this; its export sales for the year ending June 30, 1987 were expected to total 600,000 metric tons
(against total production of 3.3 million tons). Its exports the previous year were some 810,000 tons
(against total production of 3.27 million tons). Taiwan's Steel Exports, Asian Wall Street J., Mar.
20-21, 1987, at 15, col. 5 (Asian ed.). After completing its third-phase expansion project in April
1988, yearly output will reach 5.65 million metric tons, of which 3.5 to 3.65 million metric tons will
be reserved for domestic manufacturers. China Post, Jan. 20, 1987, at 7, col. 1-2. Although almost
all of the company's stock is owned by the government, it operates "in all respects ... like any
corporation in Taiwan. It pays taxes as required by law. It is on its own as far as profit and loss is
concerned. The government does not underwrite its losses in the form of subsidies." M. KING,
supra at 6.
The company has received protection by way of government controls and restrictions on im-
ports of steel, but Taiwan's Industrial steel products will be gradually removed over a six-year pe-
riod, so that by 1993 the only protection for the local industry will be "reasonable import tariffs."
Government Will Lift Import Restrictions on Steel, Cars, Tires, China News, Apr. 22, 1987, at 2, col.
7. Relaxation of import restrictions has already begun; for example, in late 1986 China Steel Corpo-
ration decided that local manufacturers could freely import cold-rolled steel coils beginning in the
first quarter of 1987. China Post, Nov. 29, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
111 For a detailed description of the various vocational training programs in Taiwan, see T.
DJANG, INDUSTRY AND LABOR IN TAIWAN ch. 9 (1976).
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cally spend three years at a vocational school, followed by six months in
a special shipbuilding vocational training center run by the government
in cooperation with an enterprise. The final step in the process is a six-
month training period on the job."'12 In 1972 Taiwan established a Na-
tional Vocational Training Fund, which has directed a good deal of its
money to private enterprises for approved training programs, often in
cooperation with vocational schools." 3 Aside from these traditional
forms of vocational training support, it has been suggested that there are
also other institutions called vocational training centers that utilize con-
vict labor under the supervision and direction of the judicial branch of
the government.
14
IV. BASIC APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF UNITED STATES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
Under governing law," 5 countervailing duties are imposed when 1)
the United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce") determines
that a country under the agreement on subsidies and countervailing
measures, or a person or organization of that country," 6 is providing a
subsidy with respect to a class or kind of merchandise imported into the
United States, and 2) the United States International Trade Commission
("ITC") determines that an industry in the United States is materially
injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of
112 Galenson, The Labor Force, Wage; and Living Standards, in GROWTH iN TAIwAN supra
note 8, at 399.
113 A payroll tax of 1.5% was established to finance the Fund. Id at 400.
114 See Fireplace Mesh Panels from Taiwan, (Petitioner's Memorandum), USITC Pub. 1284, Inv.
No. 701-TA-185.
115 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671)(1982))(amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948
(1986)).
116 Taiwan exporters are subject to the same law as exporters of the signatory status of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, because the United States law provides
for the same treatment of a country "which has assumed obligations with respect to the United
States which are substantially equivalent to obligations under the Agreement, as determined by
the President... ." This provision apparently covers Taiwan, because Congress had Taiwan in
mind when it passed this provision, and whatever derecognition may mean in diplomacy, Tai-
wan is considered a country for purposes of countervailing duty law, a fact made clear by the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The law applicable to the Agreement signatories is the one
presently being applied in respect to Taiwan. In September 1982 the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC) made a preliminary material injury determination in respect
to fireplace mesh panels from Taiwan. Since a material injury determination has been required
in that case, and since the USITC stated it was applying the law which would be applicable to
the Agreement signatories, it is clear that petitions filed against imports from Taiwan will trig-
ger investigations in which both subsidy and injury must be found before there is any violation
of countervailing duty law.
Torbert, Clubb & Peele, Exporting from Taiwan to the United States, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT,
supra note 53, at 855-56 (footnotes omitted).
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an industry is materially retarded, by reasons of that subsidized
merchandise.
A countervailable subsidy may be defined simply as "a preferential
benefit bestowed by a government, directly or indirectly, upon a product
exported to the U.S.",117  One commentator, after reviewing the gov-
erning statutory definition," 8 suggested that, "generally speaking, a sub-
117 Horlick, Subsidies and Suspension Agreements in Countervailing Duty Cases, in THE COM-
MERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, 31 (S. Unger ed.
1982) [hereinafter COMMERCE SPEAKS ON DUMPING].
118 Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) defines "subsidy" as
follows:
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that term is
used in section 303 of this Act, and includes, but is not limited to the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement relating to illustrative
list of export subsidies.
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or pri-
vately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, produc-
tion, or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commer-
cial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a
specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or distribution.
Annex A to the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 186-310, T.I.A.S. 1700 (Subsidies
Code)[hereinafter GATT] provides as follows (footnotes omitted):
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent
upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on ex-
ports.
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic products or
services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable
than for delivery of like or directly competitive products or services for use in the production of
goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions are more
favourable than those commercially available on world markets to their exporters.
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of
direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance,
over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the calcula-
tion of the base on which direct taxes are charged.
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported
products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution
of like products when sold for domestic consumption.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on
goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, remis-
sion or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the
production of like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, however, that prior
stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products
even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic con-
sumption, if the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are physically
incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported product.
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on imported
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sidy exists when: (1) there is selective government or privately sponsored
treatment; (2) the selective treatment is different than that which the re-
cipient would otherwise receive in the marketplace; and (3) the selective
treatment results in promotion of export activity."' t
There are two basic types of subsidies: export subsidies and domestic
subsidies. With some exceptions, such as remission of local sales or
value-added taxes, all benefits given by a government upon the export of
a particular product constitute improper export subsidies; these can in-
clude direct subsidies, preferential internal transport and freight charges,
price preferences for inputs to be used in the production of goods for
export, direct and indirect tax programs, remission or drawback of im-
port charges, export financing and insurance, and export promotion. 120
Export subsidies are allocated only to export sales revenue for purposes
of determining the subsidy margin.12'
Domestic subsidies are benefits conferred to promote the production
goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported
product; provided, however, that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of home market
goods equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as, the imported goods as a
substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding
export operations both occur within a reasonable time period, normally not to exceed two years.
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of
export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes
against increases in the costs of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium
rates, which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the
programmes.
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under
the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have to
pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international capital
markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and denominated in the same currency as
the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or
financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material advan-
tage in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking on official
export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to this Agreement are parties as of I
January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original signatories),
or if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an
export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an
export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of
Article XVI of the General Agreement.
For a good discussion of the origins and derivation of United States countervailing duty law, see
Horlick, Current Issues in Countervailing Duty Law, in THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979-
FOUR YEARS LATER, 11-32 (H. Applebaum & A. Victor eds. 1983).
119 Victor & Benjamin, Major Decisions of the Court of International Trade and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in IMPORT RELIEF, supra note 7, at 230.
120 See supra note 118. For a more detailed discussion of each category, see Holmer, Haggerty &
Hunter, Identifying and Measuring Subsidies Under the Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at
Synthesis, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION 328-67 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 1984) [hereinafter COMMERCE SPEAKS ON
IMPORT ADMINISTRATION]; Horlick, supra note 118 at 81-88.
121 See, eg., 50 Fed. Reg. 41,925 (1985).
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or sale of products which may or may not be exported; if the product is
later exported, a subsidy question would then arise. A key question is
whether the benefit is generally available to all business in the country or
whether it is conferred on a particular business or industry; only in the
latter case is the subsidy countervailable.122 Countervailing duties have
been imposed to offset government grants, soft government loans, gov-
ernment loan guarantees, and certain government equity contributions to
state-owned firms."' The critical issue is whether a government pay-
ment or assistance to a specific firm is consistent with commercial consid-
erations that would be applied by a private investor engaging in the same
transaction; if a loan, guaranty or payment to a specific firm is not ex-
pected to produce the type of return that a private investor would expect,
Commerce may recognize a subsidy.124 Domestic subsidies are allocated
to total sales revenue for purposes of determining the subsidy margin.125
Material injury is defined by the Trade Agreements Act as harm
"which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant. ' ' 126 Factors
which the ITC must consider in making its material injury determination
include the volume of imports (either absolutely or relative to production
or consumption), the effect of these imports on prices in the United
States (requiring consideration of price-underselling, suppression or de-
pression), and the imports' impact on domestic producers of the product
(requiring consideration of declines in output, sales, market share, prof-
its, productivity, return on investment, utilization of capacity, pricing,
cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capi-
tal, and investment).127 When assessing threat of material injury, the
ITC looks at the following for trends: the rate of increase of the exports
in question to the United States market; increases in importers' inven-
tories; capacity in the exporting country to generate additional exports;
and the likelihood that such exports will be directed to the United States
market taking into account the availability of other export markets.128
The threat must be real and the injury resulting from it must be immi-
nent, not a mere possibility based on supposition, speculation or
122 For more detailed discussion of the specificity requirement, see Horlick, Bello & Levine,
supra, note 7, at 35-76.
123 See Subsidies Code, supra note 118; for a more detailed discussion of each category, see
Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 367-409; Horlick, supra note 118, at 32-80.
124 Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 369.
125 See, &g., 47 Fed. Reg. 57,311 (1982).
126 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 771(7)(A) (July 26, 1979).
127 Id. Sections 771(7)(B)(i)-(ii), (C)(i)-(iii).





A countervailing duty proceeding involves several distinct determi-
nations. First, the ITC determines whether there is a reasonable indica-
tion that injury to a domestic industry exists by reason of subsidized
imports; if the determination is negative, the proceeding terminates. If
the determination is affirmative, Commerce makes a preliminary deter-
mination, based on the best evidence available at the time, of whether
there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that a subsidy exists. Re-
gardless of the outcome of the preliminary determination, Commerce
then proceeds to make a final determination of whether a subsidy exists.
If this determination is negative, the proceeding ends; if it is affirmative,
the ITC then proceeds to a final determination of whether the domestic
industry is being materially injured by reason of the subsidized imports.
If subsidy and injury both exist, Commerce enters a final countervailing
duty order. 130
The effect of the various determinations may be summarized as fol-
lows. In the event of a preliminary determination of subsidy, Commerce
directs the United States Customs Service ("Customs") to preclude im-
ports unless a bond or cash deposit is posted to cover the preliminary
duty amount. If a final countervailing duty order is entered, a bond no
longer suffices; Customs will not release the goods unless the importer
makes a cash deposit covering the estimated countervailing duties. The
duties are later finalized on an annual basis based upon updated price
and cost information.13 ' A countervailing duty order usually must re-
main in effect for at least twenty-four months. 132 After twenty-four
months, an application may be made for review of the underlying deter-
mination on grounds that the subsidies have been eliminated 133 or that
changed circumstances render the imports no longer injurious.
134 If
either is established, the order may be revoked as to future imports.
129 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 128, at 88-89; S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 180
(1974). For further discussion of the concepts of material injury and threat of injury, see Victor &
Benjamin, supra note 119, at 246-60; Applebaum, Recent Developments in ITC Injury Determina-
tions in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, in UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY,
173-91 (H. Applebaum & G. Kaplan ed. 1987).
130 For more complete discussion of the various phases of the proceeding, see OFICE OF INVES-
TIGATIONS, IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, [hereinafter OFFICE OF IN-
VESTIGATIONS], Processing Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, in COMMERCE
SPEAKS ON DUMPING, supra note 117, at 56-75; Kaplan, Processing Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Investigations, in COMMERCE SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION supra note 120, at 16-34.
131 Kaplan, supra note 130, 16-34.
132 19 C.F.R. §§ 54(b), 355.42(b).
133 Shambon, Annual Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, in COMMERCE
SPEAKS ON DUMPING, supra note 117, at 191-92.
134 Id at 191.
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Before a final order is issued in the first place, however, the possibility
exists for suspending or settling the case.135
Commerce and the ITC rely primarily on questionnaires for their
data. If a foreign party does not respond, the agencies may simply use
the "best information available," which may be unfavorable information
supplied by the United States petitioners. If foreign parties do cooperate,
they usually receive confidential protection for their data if they request
it. Commerce seeks to verify all foreign data through mini-audits in the
foreign country.
136
V. COUNTERVAILING DUTY PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PRODUCTS
FROM TAIwAN: 1980 TO 1986
During the past few years, countervailing duty proceedings involv-
ing imports from Taiwan have covered a variety of products, including
bicycle tires and tubes, fireplace mesh panels, welded carbon steel line
pipe, oil country tubular goods, porcelain-on-steel cooking ware, and cer-
tain stainless steel cooking ware. The following table summarizes the
preliminary and final determinations in each case as to whether benefits
constituting subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing duty law
were being provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters, 137 and
whether a domestic industry was materially injured or threatened with
material injury as a result:
131
135 Horlick, supra note 117, at 42-51; Kaplan, supra note 130, at 35-42.
136 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 130, at 85-95; Kaplan, supra note 130, at 43-52.
137 Bicycle Tires and Tubes: 46 Fed. Reg. 39,464, 53,201 (1981); Fireplace Mesh Panels: 47 Fed.
Reg. 57,310 (1982), 48 Fed. Reg. 11,305 (1983); Welded Carbon Steel Line Pipe: 50 Fed. Reg.
41,924, 53,363 (1985); Oil Country Tubular Goods: 50 Fed. Reg. 49,977 (1985), 51 Fed. Reg. 19,583
(1986); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware: 51 Fed. Reg. 7982, 36,453 (1986); Certain Stainless Steel
Cooking Ware: 51 Fed. Reg. 15,523, 42,891 (1986).
138 Bicycle Tires and Tubes: USITC Pub. 1258, Inv. No. 701-TA-94 (July 1982); Fireplace Mesh
Panels: USITC Pub. 1284, Inv. No. 701-TA-185 (Sept. 1982); Welded Carbon Steel Line Pipe:
USITC Pub. 1742, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-251-53, 731-TA-291-94 (Aug. 1985); Oil Country Tubular
Goods: USITC Pub. 1747, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-255, 256 (Sept. 1985); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking
Ware: USITC Pub. 1800, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-265-66, 731-TA-297-99 (Jan. 1986); Top-of-the-Stove
Stainless Steel Cooking Ware: USITC Pub. 1820, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267-68, 731-TA-304-05 (Mar.





Injury? Subsidy? Subsidy? Injury?
Bicycle Tires and Tubes 139  Yes Yes Yes (.9%) Yes
Fireplace Mesh Panels Yes No No (.012%) -
Welded Carbon Steel Line Pipe Yes Yes No (.02%) -
Oil Country Tubular Goods Yes No No (.11%)
Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware Yes No No (.17%) -
Certain Stainless Steel Cooking Ware Yes No Yes (2.14%) Yes
Based on a subsequent investigation, the ITC determined that the
domestic bicycle tire and tube industry would not be materially injured
or threatened with material injury, nor would the establishment of an
industry in the United States be materially retarded, by reason of imports
of bicycle tires and tubes from Taiwan, if the countervailing duty order
covering those imports were revoked. 4 The countervailing duty order
covering bicycle tires and tubes was thus revoked, 14 1 leaving the recent
order covering stainless steel cookware as the only outstanding counter-
vailing duty order against imports from Taiwan for the period under
consideration.
A few initial observations may be made at this point. First, prelimi-
nary determinations are just that. Although they provide reasonable pre-
dictions of the final determination, continuing investigation and
additional arguments can yield a different final result. Second, the fact
that preliminary injury determinations were affirmative in all the cases
suggests that the petitioner's burden of proof at that stage is not too strin-
gent, or that the domestic industry petitioning for relief is unlikely to
initiate such a proceeding in the absence of real harm, or perhaps some
combination of the two. Third, particularly in view of the adverse pre-
liminary injury determinations, it is in the respondents' joint interest in
each case to devote considerable attention to overcoming the petitioner's
allegation that the benefits in question do in fact constitute subsidies. If
none of the benefits constitute subsidies, that disposes of the case. Even if
a benefit is found to constitute a subsidy, however, individual respon-
139 The original determination found that although benefits had been received under three
programs (preferential income tax ceiling, preferential export financing, and deferred duty payments
on imported machinery and equipment), the net benefit received was de minimis. 44 Fed Reg. 1815
(1979). However, on appeal the Court of International Trade remanded, holding that the de
minimis rule is applicable to countervailing duty cases but that factual questions as to the tax ceiling
and the export financing remained, requiring further investigation. Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v.
United States, 517 F. Supp. 704, (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). The final determination found greater than
de minimis benefit. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,201 (1981).
140 48 Fed. Reg. 24,795 (1983); USITC Pub. 1382 (May 1983).
141 48 Fed. Reg. 26,655 (1983).
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dents may still prevail by establishing that they did not avail themselves
of the benefit. Finally, even respondents who have taken advantage of a
subsidy can prevail if they can demonstrate the effect is de minimis.
Thus, both issues of law and questions of fact can be important. Fourth,
the collective results of these cases tend to suggest that Taiwan is not a
heavy subsidizer of exports of either consumer or capital goods.
Given this brief overview of the results of the proceedings under
consideration, let us proceed to an analysis of how the various incentives
described in Part II have fared under the countervailing duty law.
A. Taxation
In the Fireplace Mesh Panels case, decided in 1983, Commerce con-
sidered whether the preferential income tax rate for productive enter-
prises constituted a countervailable subsidy.1 42 Commerce noted that the
SEI as it then existed had been amended recently to remove some restric-
tive criteria limiting the categories of industries eligible for encourage-
ment. 143  Commerce reasoned, however, that "the remaining general
eligibility criteria in the regulation [under the statute] still appear to limit
the availability of the benefits and appear to target certain categories of
industries of encouragement," and accordingly determined that the pref-
erential income tax rate ceiling provided a benefit which constituted a
subsidy. 1" Inasmuch as it represented "an incentive program for in-
creased general investment in eligible industries and, for [the product in
question, did] not appear to be tied to export performance," Commerce
characterized it as a domestic subsidy, with the result that the tax savings
were allocated over total sales revenue.
145
Less than two years later, however, in the Welded Carbon Steel Line
Pipe case Commerce changed its mind about the preferential income tax
rate for productive enterprises, reasoning as follows:
Article 15 benefits are available to all productive enterprises, defined in
the SEI as stock companies engaged in manufacturing, handicrafts, mining,
agriculture, forestry, fishing, animal husbandry, transportation, warehous-
ing, public utilities, public facility construction and development, public
142 There were only two known producers in Taiwan exporting the product to the U.S. during the
relevant period. One was not eligible for the preferential rate because it was not organized as a
company limited by shares; its tax rate was the normal 35%. The other did qualify and had a tax
rate of 25%. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,306 (1983).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. The measure of the benefit was the difference in the tax due under the normal 35% rate
and the preferential 25% rate for 1981, which was known and accounted for in 1982. This figure
was then divided by total sales for 1981, recruiting in a benefit of 0.012% ad valorem. Id
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housing construction, technical services, hotels and heavy machinery
construction.
In prior cases, we found this program to be a subsidy based upon insuf-
ficient evidence that the program is non-specific. However, the evidence in
this case indicates that these benefits are not limited to an industry or enter-
prise or group of industries or enterprises. Therefore, we determine that
this program does not confer countervailable benefits within the meaning of
the countervailing duty law. 146
The Oil Country Tubular Goods case confirmed this analysis.147
However, in the Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware case initiated in De-
cember 1985, the respondents included Collins Co. Ltd., one of Taiwan's
big trading companies. Commerce noted that in previous cases it had
grouped the tax benefits granted to big trading companies under the pro-
gram with the income tax ceiling granted to productive enterprises. 48
Commerce noted that, at verification, big trading company status was
granted only to companies which met certain criteria established by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs ("MOEA").14 9 Reasoning that "the crite-
ria established by the MOEA clearly indicate that the preferential tax
treatment extended to big trading companies is based on export perform-
ance," Commerce determined that the program conferred a benefit con-
stituting an export subsidy and allocated the tax savings over the value of
Collins' export sales.150
Collins was also a respondent in the Stainless Steel Cooking Ware
case, in which it received similar treatment with respect to the preferen-
tial tax ceiling.15' In that case, Commerce allocated a portion of the tax
savings to the manufacturers who exported the subject products to the
United States through Collins, then divided the benefits allocated to
those manufacturers by their exports of the subject product to the United
States during the period in question.
152
None of the cases yielded a decision on whether the tax preferences
for venture capital investment enterprises or the other indus*tries to be
encouraged specifically referred to in SEI Article 15 gave rise to
countervailable subsidies. The specificity test applied by Commerce in
the Welded Carbon Steel Line Pipe case153 should also be controlling
146 50 Fed. Reg. 53,364 (1985).
147 51 Fed. Reg. 19,588 (1986).
148 51 Fed. Reg. 36,455 (1986).
149 Id. See also supra note 78.
150 Id. The calculation yielded an estimated net subsidy of 0.1610% ad valorem.
151 51 Fed. Reg. 42,893 (1986).
152 Id. The estimated net subsidy was 0.010% ad valorem.
153 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The specificity test has been explained as follows:
The approach Commerce developed in regard to the specificity question is to examine the
legislation or implementing regulations of a government program under investigation to deter-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:138(1988)
with respect to such situations if they are brought into issue in future
cases. If the fifteen categories of activity to which productive enterprises
are limited by SEI Article 3154 do not constitute a "group of industries or
enterprises" for purposes of applying the specificity test, then it is not
readily apparent why the other industries to be specially encouraged
under Article 15 should be treated any differently.I55 Whether the SEI's
tax holiday and accelerated depreciation provisions156  constitute
countervailable subsidies' 57 should also turn on a consistent application
of the specificity test.
The investment tax credit was originally found to be countervailable
"because respondents were unable to demonstrate that these benefits
were not limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries." ' If a respondent could show, however, that it
received the benefit of the credit only for investments in equipment for
the production of merchandise other than that involved in the particular
proceeding, it was not regarded as a countervailable benefit with respect
to sale of the merchandise at issue.I59 In the Welded Carbon Steel Line
Pipe case, however, Commerce found that a benefit available to all pro-
ductive enterprises was not limited to an industry or enterprise or group
of industries or enterprises and thus was not a countervailable subsidy."W
Commerce has consistently held that because the export loss
reserves program is "contingent upon export sales," it confers a benefit
which constitutes an export subsidy.16 ' To calculate the benefit received
in one calendar year, Commerce treats the tax savings from the export
loss reserve as a one-year interest-free loan received in the middle of the
preceding year at the time the income tax forms were filed. The interest-
free rate is then compared with the maximum lending rate set by the
mine its statutory availability. If a program is by law or by its nature limited to certain partici-
pants (as most programs are), Commerce must rule whether that limitation is stringent enough
to warrant possible countervailing duties. If the law does not limit benefits to particular recipi-
ents, or the limitation is not stringent enough to warrant possible countervailing duties, Com-
merce examines the actual implementation of the program to determine whether in fact the
benefits of the program are limited to a specific industry or group of industries, including the
industry under investigation.
Horlick, Bello & Levine, supra note 7, at 47.
154 See supra note 76.
155 Just as the Executive Yuan has published Categories and Criteria of Productive Enterprises
Eligible for Encouragement, so has it published Categories and Criteria for Special Encouragement of
Important Productive Enterprises.
156 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
157 The cases have yielded no express determinations one way or the other.
158 51 Fed. Reg. 19,585 (1986).
159 49 Fed. Reg. 14,778 (1984).
160 50 Fed. Reg. 53,365 (1985).
161 50 Fed. Reg. 53,364 (1985).
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Central Bank. The benefit is then divided by the value of the respon-
dent's total exports for the year to yield the net subsidy.'62
The old business and stamp tax exemptions or rebate for export
sales (which correspond to the VAT zero rate for export sales) were held
not to constitute countervailable benefits on grounds that under the
countervailing duty act, the nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes lev-
ied at the final stage is not considered a subsidy. 63 Thus, if the amount
of the exemption or rebate was not greater than the amount of business
or stamp tax due, there was no subsidy. Presumably, the same result
would pertain under the new VAT system. Although the VAT is not
limited by its terms to the final stage transfer of goods, the business tax
apparently was not so limited either, inasmuch as its export sale exemp-
tion expressly extended to sales to manufacturers for further processing
before export. In any event, the nonexcessive rebate of prior-stage cumu-
lative indirect taxes borne by inputs that are physically incorporated into
the final product is not considered a subsidy under United States coun-
tervailing duty law.'
No cases have discussed the issue of the harbor and commodity tax
export exemptions. The commodity tax appears to fall within the scope
of indirect taxes, the nonexcessive remission of which is not considered a
subsidy.165 Although collection of a harbor tax on imports only certainly
smacks of discriminatory treatment, it does not necessarily follow that no
collection of the harbor tax on exports should be regarded as a subsidy.
Even if it were, the intrinsic difficulty of calculating the value in a partic-
ular case of such a subsidy defies comprehension.
B. Customs Duties
With respect to the remission of duties on imported raw materials
incorporated in re-exported products, Commerce noted in the Bicycle
Tires and Tubes case a Taiwan regulation which provided that if the raw
material was not exported in finished goods within 18 months from the
date of importation, the duty on the raw material had to be paid, to-
gether with a delinquent fee of 0.05% per day from the day of importa-
162 These calculations yielded subsidies of 0.02% ad valorem in the Welded Carbon Steel Line
Pipe Case, 50 Fed. Reg. 53,364 (1985), 0.01% ad valorem in the Oil Country Tubular Goods case, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,585 (1986), and 0.001% ad valorem in the Stainless Steel Cooking Ware case. 51 Fed.
Reg. 42,893 (1986).
163 50 Fed. Reg. 53,364 (1985). For a discussion of the rules governing indirect tax programs, see
Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 335-42.
164 50 Fed. Reg. 41,925 (1985).
165 See Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 335-42, and supra notes 94-96 and ac-
companying text.
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tion. Commerce found that this fee was greater than the comparable
commercial interest rate. The program thus did not provide funds at less
than commercial rates, and it therefore did not give rise to a countervail-
able subsidy. 6
In the Stainless Steel Cooking Ware case, however, Commerce
found a subsidy on grounds that the duty drawback for raw materials
incorporated into exports was overrated. 167 Under the Taiwan duty
drawback system, duties paid on imported raw materials incorporated in
exports are refunded on a shipment-by-shipment basis and are calculated
by applying a pre-established duty drawback rate to the net weight of the
finished product in each export shipment. The Taiwan authorities ap-
prove the duty drawback rate for each export product based on raw ma-
terial usage and production yield data submitted by manufacturers of the
export product. For the stainless steel cooking ware under investigation,
the Taiwan authorities established an authorized loss rate for raw materi-
als used in the manufacture of exported goods. Duty drawback included
the amount of duty remitted on the loss or wastage of the raw
material. 168
The problem is that these allowable loss rates included material
which might later be sold as scrap. Although a duty drawback program
which includes some amount for loss or wastage in the calculation of the
amount to be remitted on raw materials used in the manufacture of ex-
ported goods is not necessarily countervailable, unreasonable or excessive
rates do become countervailable. Duty drawback received on recover-
able scrap constitutes an unreasonable or excessive rebate of customs du-
ties. To determine whether a subsidy was present in the Stainless Steel
Cooking Ware case, the verification team reviewed summary worksheets
used by the Taiwan authorities to calculate the loss rate. However, the
loss rates were not based directly on stainless steel cooking ware, but
166 49 Fed. Reg. 14,778 (1984).
167 The applicable Commerce rule provides:
Drawback of duties: The drawback, rebate or remission of Customs duties not in excess of
the actual duties due or paid, on imported items physically incorporated in the final product is
not regarded as a subsidy. The drawback, rebate or remission of duties on imported capital
goods or other items involved in the production but not physically incorporated in the exported
merchandise would be countervailable.
19 C.F.R. § 355, Annex 1, 1.3. For a general discussion of the governing principles on remission or
drawback of import charges, see Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 342-46; Kaplan &
Varga, Recent Developments in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Area, in IMPORT RELIEF
supra note 7, at 89-93.
168 For stainless steel sheet or coil used in the production of cooking ware, the input ratio im-
puted in the duty drawback rate was 1.48. This means that to claim duty drawback on an exported
pot weighing one kilogram, 1.48 kilograms of stainless steel was assumed to be physically incorpo-
rated in the exported pot. 51 Fed. Reg. 42,893 (1986).
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rather on other stainless steel kitchenware grouped and classified by the
Taiwan authorities in the same duty drawback category as cookware.
Thus, the verification team considered it necessary to examine the com-
panies' information concerning loss rates. Comparing the loss rate ap-
proved by the Taiwan authorities to the actual loss rate, excluding from
the comparison the loss attributable to recoverable scrap, Commerce
found the approved loss rate to be excessive. Thus, a portion of the im-
ported raw materials .duty drawback was countervailable.
169
Also, imported materials not physically incorporated into export
merchandise cannot give rise to duty drawback. In the Stainless Steel
Cooking Ware case, one of the manufacturers had received duty draw-
back on two types of liquid polish used to polish stainless steel metal in
the subject merchandise. Because the manufacturer was unable to
demonstrate at verification that the liquid metal polishes were physically
incorporated into the exported product, the drawback of import duties
and indirect harbor taxes on the imported liquid polish was held to con-
stitute a countervailable subsidy.
170
None of the respondents in the cases under consideration took ad-
vantage of the duty exemptions and deferrals provided under the SEI for
productive enterprises importing selected machinery and equipment.
For the same reason applicable to the income tax preferences for produc-
tive enterprises, the opportunity afforded generally to productive enter-
prises to pay import duties and dues on selected capital equipment in a
series of installments beginning one year from the date use commences is
probably not a subsidy for countervailing duty law purposes. 171 How-
ever, to the extent the remaining capital goods customs duties benefits in
169 To calculate the benefit from the excessive drawback, the percentage of the excessive duty
drawback was multiplied by each exporter's total amount of duty drawback. Dividing by total ex-
ports of the subject producers, a net 2.128% ad valorem subsidy resulted. Id.
170 Duty drawback on the two types of polish had been received by one of the manufacturers only
on export shipments of the subject merchandise made on or after November 26, 1985 (the review
period was calendar year 1985). For those export shipments made after November 26, 1985, and
during the review period, Commerce computed the amount of duty drawback attributable to the
liquid metal polish and divided this amount by total 1985 exports of the three manufacturers for
which it had information concerning duty drawback to arrive at a net subsidy of 0.002% ad valorem.
51 Fed. Reg. 42,894 (1986).
171
[The remission or drawback of import duties on imported capital goods] may not be a
subsidy, or at least not countervailable in full, if the program is generally available; i.e., if duties
on imported capital goods are rebated regardless of whether the capital goods are used to pro-
duce output for the home or foreign markets. In this situation, all users of capital goods may
take advantage of the duty rebates. Therefore, the duty-free or reduced duty treatment of im-
ported capital goods is the normal market condition facing users of capital goods in that
country.
Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 346.
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Taiwan are keyed to export production,172 their utilization would proba-
bly give rise to a subsidy. 173
C. Financing
Exporters utilized the low-cost export loans available pursuant to
the Central Bank's Export Loan Discount Regulation in the cases involv-
ing welded carbon steel line pipe, oil country tubular goods and porce-
lain-on-steel ware. Commerce found that these loans depended upon
export performance and that they therefore provided funds to borrowers
at interest rates lower than those available for other purposes. Thus,
they were determined to confer benefits constituting export subsidies.174
To calculate the benefit, the differences between the Central Bank's ex-
port-loan rate and its maximum short-term loan rate was multiplied by
the principal amount of the subject loans. This benefit was then allocated
against the value of the borrower's exports of the product under investi-
gation to the United States for the period in question.17 5
None of the cases under consideration involved equity infusions
under the Executive Yuan's special development fund to promote invest-
ments of interest to national economic development. The purposes speci-
fied for use of the fund are not keyed to export performance; thus,
utilization of the fund would not give rise to an export subsidy unless it
could be established that the fund was used for that purpose in practice.
However, if utilization resulted in provision of capital, loans or loan
guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations, it
could constitute a domestic subsidy.17 6 If utilization gave rise to a re-
search and development subsidy, it could also be countervailable if not
172 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
173
[I]f the duty drawback for capital goods is contingent upon the export performance of the
user of the capital good, the exporter essentially receives a grant which reduces his cost of
manufacturing the exported product. With respect to the deferral of import duty payments on
imported capital equipment used to produce for export, the exporter obtains the use of money at
an interest rate (zero) below that which he would have paid had he borrowed that money com-
mercially. Thus, the deferral of import duty payments on imported capital goods is also a
subsidy, and Commerce treats it like an interest-free loan.
Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 346-47.
174 50 Fed. Reg. 53,363-64 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 19,584 (1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 36,455 (1986). For a
general discussion of the principles governing export financing in this context, see Holmer, Haggerty
& Hunter, supra note 120, at 347-60.
175 The net subsidies were 0.002% ad valorem for welded carbon steel line pipe, 50 Fed. Reg.
53,364 (1985); 0.10% ad valorem for oil country tubular goods, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,583 (1986); and
0.0073% ad valorem for porcelain-on-steel cooking ware. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,583 (1986); and 0.0073%
ad valorem for porcelain-on-steel cooking ware. 51 Fed. Reg. 36,455 (1986).
176 For a general discussion of the circumstances under which such infusions constitute domes-




made available to a wide number of industries or groups of industries.' 77
D. Pricing
Under GATT, a price preference for inputs used in the production
of export goods constitutes a subsidy only if the preference lowers the
price below world market levels. 7 ' China Steel's second-tier oil prices to
the pipe and tube producers in the Carbon Steel Line Pipe and Oil Coun-
try Tubular Goods cases were found to be at world-market levels. Ac-
cordingly, its two-tiered pricing policy was held not to confer a
countervailable benefit within the meaning of the countervailing duty
law.179
E. Labor
In the Fireplace Mesh Panels case, Commerce found that no manu-
facturers, producers, or exporters in Taiwan had made use of vocational
training centers during the period for which subsidization was being
measured or since that time.80 Their utilization, however, would not
necessarily have given rise to a countervailable subsidy. With respect to
programs available nationally, Commerce has refused to find countervail-
able, due to lack of specificity, such programs as business industry coop-
erative training, vocational training for school-leavers, assistance for
improvement in working conditions, short-time work assistance for
travel expenses for workers living far from their jobs, and some early
retirement plans.' 8 ' Where aid lowers wages of selected workers, how-
ever, thereby reducing production costs, a domestic subsidy could
result. 182
VI. TRENDS AND ISSUES
The following table summarizes the analysis of Part V with respect
to each of the incentives described in Part III, demonstrating those in-
centives that have been held to constitute subsidies and the amount of
the subsidy in the cases under consideration:
177 For a general discussion of research and development subsidies, see Horlick, supra note 118,
at 67-70.
178 For a general discussion of price preferences for inputs to be used in the production of goods
for export, see Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, supra note 120, at 331-33.
179 50 Fed. Reg. 53,364 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 19,585 (1986).
180 48 Fed. Reg. 11,306 (1983).
181 Horlick, supra note 118, at 77.
182 See id at 78-79.
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No Determination
As indicated by the table, Commerce has not agreed with the peti-
tioners with respect to a majority of the incentives alleged to constitute
countervailable subsidies. Although the income tax preference for pro-
ductive enterprises and investment tax credit were earlier regarded as
countervailable subsidies, these two incentives have since escaped that
adverse characterization. The income tax preference for big trading
companies, the export loss reserve, and low-cost export loan financing
are the only incentives which have been uniformly characterized as
countervailable subsidies. Even in those cases, however, the degree of
subsidization is minimal. In this context, several trends and issues war-
rant further analysis.
A. Particular Incentives
A number of changes relating to existing export incentives are al-




through mid-1988, it very nearly expired at the end of July 1987.183 The
prospects for its general continuation beyond the present 1988 termina-
tion date pose problems. The harbor tax will no longer be levied only on
imports.184 In addition, the Finance Ministry has announced plans to
greatly reduce the number of import items exempted from port
surcharges.
18 5
The role of the export processing zones also appears to be changing.
The Export Processing Zone Administration in 1986 made a number of
proposals for additional tax benefits and other encouragements to manu-
facturers in the zones.186 The Ministry of Economic Affairs vetoed them
in order to avoid discrepancies between the EPZs and general industrial
zones. '87 The Ministry decided, however, to allow companies inside the
EPZs to sell a specified amount of their annual production to the local
market after paying commodity taxes.188 This represents a shift of em-
phasis, as all EPZ-manufactured goods had previously been for export
only.
The practice of awarding enterprises the privilege of paying on an
account basis import tariffs for raw materials to be processed for eventual
export 1 9 is consistent with a policy of encouraging exports, because until
the deferred payments are due such enterprises have the advantage of
being able to use their funds for investment purposes. However, in 1984
and 1985 collection became increasingly difficult. 90 Accordingly, the In-
spectorate General of Customs in 1986 tightened the qualifying require-
183 See supra note 84.
184 See supra note 93.
185 The Finance Ministry instructed the Inspectorate General of Customs to review the list of
items exempt from port surcharge. Among them are industrial and agricultural products and raw
materials for the export processing zones, science industrial park and bonded factories. Finance
Ministry officials said that except for those that still must enjoy such privileges because of military
and diplomatic considerations, all commercial items should be subjected to port surcharges. China
News, June 18, 1987, at 8, col. 1-2.
186 The Administration's proposals included a tax reduction from 25% to 22% for manufacturers
in the EPZs, setting up of warehouses and transshipment stations, and relaxing restrictions on for-
eign exchange. China Post, Jan. 17, 1987, at 7, col. 4.
187 Id
188 China News, May 23, 1987, at 8, col. 1. It was reported in late 1987 that
in order to encourage makers in export processing zones to import more raw materials and
manufacture more goods for domestic sale, the MOEA has decided to revise processing zone
regulations to raise the rate of domestic sales allowed to 50% from the original 20% and, also,
to allow manufacturers to engage in distribution.
Asia Business Weekly, Dec. 9, 1987, at 53.
189 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
190 In 1984, there were 55 tax evasion cases involving NT$260 million in unpaid accounts; after
court proceedings only NTS1O million was recovered. In 1985, there were 107 cases involving
NT$430 million in unpaid accounts, of which only NT$30 million was recovered. China Post, July
12, 1986, at 7, col. 2.
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ments for privileged duty payments. Now, when importing raw
materials to be processed for eventual export, only those enterprises with
annual export sales in excess of 100 million New Taiwan dollars ("NT
dollars" or "NT$") have the right to pay import tariffs on an account
basis against a guarantee that deferred payment will be made within the
5-year period specified by law.
191
The Central Bank has already altered its loan policies encouraging
export sales. 192 A review of the Central Bank's interest rates on accom-
modations to banks reveals that the historical spread between the redis-
count rate and accommodations for export financing has closed.
193
Similarly, a review of the historical spread between general unsecured
loan rates and export loan rates charged by banks demonstrate a narrow-
ing of the spread. 194 The increases in the foreign exchange banks' export
191 Id. col. 1. Previously, enterprises had been allowed to manage the payment of their tariff
duties on an account basis: 1) when their average export revenues for the past two years exceeded
NT$60 million, or their refunded/offset import tax value totaled more than NT$20 million annually;
2) when their average export revenues for the last four years exceeded NT$20 million or their re-
funded/offset import duties were more than NT$lO million annually, and when such enterprises did
not have delinquent tax payments during that period; and 3) when they belonged to industries as
stipulated in Article 20 of the SEI. Id, col. 1-2.
192 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
193 Table 24 at page 102 of the March 1987 Taiwan Financial Statistics Monthly published by the
Central Bank reveals the following interest rates of the Central Bank on accommodations to banks,
measured in percent/annum:
194 Table 24 at page 106 of the March 1987 Taiwan Financial Statistics Monthly published by the




bill negotiated interest rates since the beginning of 1987195 also reflect the
ending of the era of bank-subsidized exports is drawing to a close. Begin-
ning in May 1987, the Central Bank ceased providing special foreign ex-
change financing to domestic banks that provide loans to businesses for
Table 4
Accommod. Import Accommod.
Effective against Financing Accommod. for Export
Date of secured Temporary in Foreign in Foreign Financing
Change Rediscounts loans Accommod. Exchange Currency (NT$)
3/16/71 9.8 10.5 12.5 7.5
5/29/71 9.25 10.0 12.0 7.5
7/01/72 8.5 9.25 11.25 7.5
1/24/73 8.5 9.25 11.25 5.5 - 6.5 7.5 6.5
4/24/73 8.5 9.25 11.25 5.5 - 6.5 7.5 6.5
7/26/73 9.5 10.5 12.0 5.5 - 6.5 7.5 7.5
10/24/73 10.75 11.75 13.25 5.5 - 6.5 7.5 8.75
1/27/74 14.0 15.5 17.5 9 - 10 10.0 12.0
5/04/74 14.0 15.5 17.5 9 - 10 10.0 10.0
9/19/74 12.5 14.0 16.0 9 - 10 10.0 8.5
12/13/74 12.0 13.5 15.5 9 - 10 10.0 8.0
2/22/75 11.5 12.75 14.75 9- 10 10.0 7.25
4/21/75 10.75 12.0 14.0 9 - 10 10.0 6.5
11/27/75 10.75 12.0 14.0 9 - 10 10.0 6.0
5/01/76 10.75 12.0 14.0 8- 10 10.0 6.0
10/22/76 10.0 11.25 13.25 8- 10 9.0 6.0
12/15/76 9.5 10.75 12.75 8- 10 9.0 6.0
4/01/77 8.75 10.0 12.0 8- 10 8.5 5.5
6/10/77 8.25 9.5 11.5 8- 10 8.5 5.5
6/16/78 8.25 9.5 11.5 8.0 8.5 5.5
5/16/79 9.5 11.0 13.25 9.5 10.0 8.5
8/22/79 11.0 12.5 14.75 10.5 11.0 9.5
1/05/81 12.0 13.5 15.75 11.5 12.5 10.0
6/15/81 13.25 14.75 17.0 12.5 13.5 11.25
10/21/81 12.25 13.25 15.75 11.75 12.75 10.5
12/17/81 11.75 12.75 15.25 11.25 12.5 10.0
2/26/82 11.25 12.5 14.75 11.25 12.25 10.0
4/17/82 10.25 11.5 13.75 10.25 11.25 9.0
7/12/82 9.25 10.5 12.5 9.75 10.75 8.25
9/18/82 8.5 9.75 11.5 9.25 10.25 7.75
12/30/82 7.75 9.0 10.75 8.5 9.5 7.75
3/16/83 7.25 8.5 10.25 8.25 9.0 7.0
3/09/84 7.0 8.25 10.0 8.25 9.0 6.75
11/24/85 6.75 8.0 10.0 8.25 9.0 6.75
3/22/85 6.75 7.75 10.0 8.25 9.0 6.75
6/17/85 6.25 7.25 10.0 7.75 8.5 6.25
9/17/85 5.75 6.75 9.75 7.75 8.5 5.75
11/23/85 5.25 6.25 9.5 7.5 8.25 5.25
3/04/86 4.75 5.75 9.0 7.0 7.75 4.75
10/18/86 4.5 5.5 9.0 6.75 7.5 4.5
195 Under the government policy of encouraging exports, Taiwan's forex designated banks previ-
ously calculated interest payments according to the low-level interest rates of the New Taiwan dol-
lar. However, since the Central Bank began to absorb most of the forex long positions of forex
designated banks, they were forced to borrow U.S. dollars for customers and decided to bring their
interest rates in line with that of the U.S. dollar. This resulted in an increase in the export bill
negotiated interest rate from 5.75% per annum to 8% from the end of 1986 to mid-March 1987. See
China Post, Jan. 7, 1987, at 7, col. 2 and Mar. 24, 1987, at 7, col. 2-3.
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importing daily necessities and important industrial raw materials. 96
The export incentives repeatedly raised in the countervailing duty
cases discussed in this Article appear to be diminishing in importance,
relative to new policy initiatives now under consideration in Taiwan.
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196 China News, Apr. 25, 1987, at 8, col. 8. By late 1987, these measures, together with the
central bank's action to freeze local banks' foreign debt ceilings on October 13, had begun to exert a
noticeable adverse impact on small and medium-size export enterprises. China Post, Nov. 24, 1987,









cember 1986 that a statute regulating medium- and long-term import
loans had been approved by the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of
encouraging and expanding imports; according to the statute, the Ex-
imbank would offer medium- and long-term import loans at low interest
rates for the importation of advanced machinery, equipment, essential
industrial raw materials, high-end parts and components, and the trans-
fer of technology. 197 In May 1987, the Ministries of Economic Affairs
and Foreign Affairs proposed the establishment of an overseas economic
cooperation development fund; the fund would aim to encourage devel-
oping countries to purchase Taiwan-made products and whole plant
equipment, as well as to stimulate overseas investment by Taiwan inves-
tors. 198 In June 1987, the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that
it was studying the feasibility of establishing a revolving fund to help
finance imports of United States machinery in a bid to cut down the
United States-Taiwan trade imbalance. 199 Authorities announced a vari-
ety of programs geared toward developing higher technology and service
industries" 0 and helping small and medium businesses upgrade their op-
erations and management 201 in the first half of 1987. While the impetus
for these measures may be to slow the New Taiwan dollar's appreciation
and thereby maintain export competitiveness, even their partial enact-
ment would promote importing, open up the Taiwan market somewhat,
and reduce the subsidization of exports.
B. Problems with United States Countervailing Duty Law: Its
Application to Taiwan
Application of United States countervailing duty law to imports
from Taiwan raises problems on both procedural and substantive levels.
In the context of any particular case, the process of collecting informa-
tion in Taiwan presents any number of difficulties. In making its deter-
minations, Commerce relies primarily upon respondents' questionnaire
responses and information obtained at verification; it also has available to
it information obtained in previous investigations and information sub-
197 China Post, Dec. 6, 1986, at 7, col. 2.
198 China Post, May 26, 1987, at 7, col. 1. As proposed, the fund would initially be raised by
means of a bond issuance, budgeting, and use of foreign exchange reserves. Id.
199 China News, June 2, 1987, at 8, ol. 7.
200 See, eg., New Approach Expected in Programs to Develop Strategic Industries, China News,
Mar. 31, 1987, at 8, col. 1-3; Large Service Firms to Get Incentives, China Post, Mar. 28, 1987, at 7,
col. 2.
201 See eg., Small Businesses to Get Low-interest Bank Loans, China News, Mar. 16, 1987, at 2,
col. 7-8; MOEA Completes Plan to Help Businesses Upgrade Operations, China News, Apr. 8, 1987,
at 2, col. 4-5.
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mitted by the petitioners, as well as published reports and studies.2 02 The
questionnaires presented by Commerce to the respondents and Taiwan
government address the issues raised in the petitions and any additional
relevant issues raised in prior investigations; the questions attempt to
elicit information which will aid Commerce in determining whether sub-
sidization is occurring.20 3 A verification team visits Taiwan to confirm
the accuracy and completeness of the information submitted by respon-
dents and used by Commerce in making its final determination.204
Even with questionnaire responses and a verification team's on-site
inspection, however, questions arise as to the accuracy of the factual in-
formation made available. Knowledgeable commentators on the Taiwan
business scene have pointed out significant deficiencies in the information
systems utilized by Taiwan business enterprises. The standardization of
accounting systems and procedures is questionable.20 5 With respect to
communication of information generally, "in Taiwanese firms it can well
be argued that distortion is both more systematic and severe than in
many Western societies. '206 Problems of business corruption have been
cited by both academics 2 7 and government officials.2"8 Although there
202 Kaplan, supra note 130, at 43-44.
203 Id. at 44.
204 Id. at 45.
205 Robert Silin i  his classic anthropological study, Leadership and Valuer The Organization of
Large-Scale Taiwanese Enterprises (1976), makes the following observations in connection with his
discussion of Taiwan stock and bond markets: "As of now there is no viable system by which
company statements can be substantiated. The public accounting system (CPA), instituted primar-
ily at the request of American AID [Agency of International Development] officials, is neither well
understood nor accepted. Allowing outsiders access to financial records continues to engender con-
siderable concern." Id at 27. His observations on the superior/subordinate relationship also shed
light on this issue:
Superiors often make changes in work done by subordinates without explanations, even
when the subordinate has superior knowledge, either because the superior assumes his greater
competence or simply to exhibit his superior status. Such actions ... undermine effective opera-
tions both by violating the utility of technical procedures and by reducing the commitment of
subordinates who find that careful work is not utilized by superiors. The lack of sound cost
accounting procedures in most Taiwanese firms stems in part from such practices. One junior
executive has remarked: "Even if they wanted to, [employees] would be unable to prepare
proper cost accounting materials. The person above the one who does the original calculations
does not really trust him so he adds a bit to his calculation. As you go up, each person tacks on
a bit so that by the time you get through, the amount they say it costs to produce something and
the real cost are quite different."
ia at 84.
206 Id. at 86.
207 Silin quotes a professor as commenting, "Most people in industry have not made their money
legitimately. Instead, they have done something dishonest or at least have not worked hard." Id at
29.
208
If [Commerce] is unable to verify satisfactorily the information .. ., [it] will notify the
submitter of its intent to proceed with the investigation on the basis of the best information
available. The "best information available" may include information submitted by the peti-
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are incentives for respondents to provide complete and accurate informa-
tion,2' 9 the context just described would be bound to leave doubts about
any information received.
The tracing of subsidies and their impact on the price of any partic-
ular product can present computational difficulties. Two examples from
the Bicycle Tires and Tubes case illustrate the problem. One of the re-
spondents maintained that instead of allocating its total income tax bene-
fit over total sales, Commerce should calculate the tax benefit on income
earned on bicycle tire and tube sales and allocate that benefit over sales of
bicycle tires and tubes; Commerce responded that the income tax prefer-
ence was based upon the respondent's total income and was therefore a
benefit bestowed on all of the respondent's production, not just bicycle
tire and tube production.210 Conversely, the petitioner argued that pref-
erential loans and income tax deductions the respondent had received
with respect to products other than bicycle tires and tubes represented an
indirect benefit to its bicycle tire and tube production because of the fun-
gibility of capital; Commerce responded that benefits received for partic-
ular purposes were not fungible and not equally beneficial to all products
made by the firm in question.211 While the distinction may be clear con-
ceptually, it may be difficult to draw in practice. An even more compli-
cated tracing problem arises with respect to causality analysis when
considering the effects of subsidized imports where there is already a final
tioner .... If a respondent unreasonably refuses to provide requested information, that fact will
be taken into account in determining what constitutes the best information available.
Kaplan, supra note 130, at 45-46.
Because the governments policies and regulations are brought into issue in a countervailing
duty case, it takes an active role in encouraging and coordinating responses. A lawyer in-the Board
of Foreign Trade is responsible for coordinating compliance by individual respondents, and the gov-
ernment absorbs at least a portion of legal defense costs. Interviews with May Yi-Meei Guo of the
Board of Foreign Trade (Jan. 23, 1987), and Thomas H. McGowan, a partner with the law firm of
Kaplan, Russin, Veechi and Parker in Taipei (Mar. 13, 1987). In antidumping cases, by contrast,
the government's involvement on behalf of respondents is significantly reduced, inasmuch as it re-
gards export sale pricing as a matter largely within the respondent's own discretion. Ia
209 In 1987, the Finance Ministry moved to revise the current law to allow significant rewards (a
maximum NT$2.4 million) "in order to encourage people to cooperate with tax authorities to crack
down on rampant tax evasion." China News, June 15, 1987, at 8, col. 8.
210 48 Fed. Reg. 43,367 (1983).
211 While the law clearly envisions reaching subsidies which benefit
a product indirectly as well as directly, it would be inconsistent with the clehr intent of the
statute, as reflected in its legislative history, to allocate to products under review any portion of
benefits clearly tied to products not under review. We allocate fully to products under review
any subsidies directly tied to them. To allocate tied subsidies fully to the products to which
they were tied and simultaneously to allocate any part of the same subsidies to other products
would result in double counting, which would be inconsistent with both the statute and the
Subsidies Code.
48 Fed. Reg. 43,366 (1983).
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dumping finding in place on the same imports.212
Finally, United States countervailing duty law in its entirety is sub-
ject to criticism. Professor Tarullo has argued that although the counter-
vailing duty law may be justified by an efficient-market rationale, in
practice it fails to promote the goal of economic efficiency; moreover, it is
undemocratic in operation and often unfair to both workers and consum-
ers.2 13 Professor Yoffie has demonstrated how it is possible for import
control laws to "create opportunities as well as dangers for exporting
countries" '214 and how, in the case of the shoe orderly marketing arrange-
ment in the late 1970's, the United States footwear industry bore the
greatest losses.215 The extent to which countervailing duty should apply
to imports from state-controlled economies has long been a muddy issue
as well.216 Despite possible criticism that can be leveled against the law
and its operation, it remains an integral part of the current system of
international trade law and has been adopted and applied by Taiwan it-
self.2 17  Indeed, the Taiwan government is considering ways to
strengthen the function of its countervailing duty system.218 As the Tai-
wan economy continues to develop, its own perceived need to respond to
212 47 Fed. Reg. 40,729-30 (1982).
213 Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARv. L. REV. 547,
552-79 (1987).
214 D. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECIONISM - STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRALIZING
COUNTRIES 3 (1983).
215 Id. at 169-203.
216 See Stoltenberg, Trends in PRC Import Cases Under U.S. Trade Law, 21 COLUM. J. WORLD
Bus., 41, 43-44 (1986).
217 Article 46 of Taiwan's Customs Law provides:
When a bounty or subsidy has been received either directly or indirectly during the process
of manufacturing, production or export shipment of the imported goods in the exporting or
manufacturing country whereby constituting a harmful effect to the industries of the Republic
of China, the imported goods shall be liable to pay an appropriate Countervailing Duty in
addition to the Customs duty leviable in accordance with the Customs Import tariff.
Article 46-2 goes on to define "harmful effect" as referring to "cases whereunder the import of
such goods will cause substantial damage to or impose a threat of substantial damage to the relevant
industry or industries of the Republic of China or will cause a substantial delay in the establishment
of any particular industry in the Republic of China."
The Executive Yuan promulgated Enforcement Rules for Imposition of Countervailing Dates
and Anti-Dumping Duties on July 3, 1984. A review of these rules reveals a number of similarities
to U.S. countervailing duty law, described supra in Part IV.
218 A government official recently stated:
[G]overnment efforts in the liberalization of trade and internationalization of the economy
will step-by-step eliminate all high-duty trade barriers and self-control of commodity imports,
which have protected the local market. How to establish a system of countervailing taxation to
prevent dumping by protectionist trade partners, therefore, has become an urgent task for the
government.
China News, Apr. 16, 1987, at 2, col. 8.
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low-priced imports from other, less developed countries21 9 will probably'
cause it to be less critical of the rules and principles embodied in the
United States import control law system.
C. Structural Economic Issues and Policy Considerations
Perhaps the most significant "subsidies" of Taiwan's exports to the
United States in recent years exist in two factors which do not come
directly into play in the operation of the countervailing duty law: the
exchange rate and the cost of labor.
One of the Taiwan government's more notable achievements has
been its role in bringing under control rampant inflation following World
War II. In 1948, prices on the island shot up 1,145%.220 Beginning with
the monetary reform of June 1949, a series of contractionary monetary
policies and efforts to encourage savings were credited with restoring sta-
bility, so that by 1952 the rate of inflation had dropped to 23%.221 The
government's fiscal policies since 1949 can quite properly be character-
ized as conservative; yet, from the institution of its first economic con-
struction plan in 1953, Taiwan has enjoyed one of the world's highest
rates of sustained economic growth.222 At the same time, per capita in-
come has risen significantly; in 1953, United States per capita income
was 25 times that in Taiwan, while in 1983 it was only 5.3 times the
Taiwan level.223 While this was happening, the New Taiwan dollar ex-
change rate saw little variation. From 1971 through mid-1986, the ex-
change rate remained within a 38-40:1 range except for the 1978-1980
period when it dropped to 36:1.224 Since the New Taiwan dollar was
pegged to the United States dollar, Taiwan's comparative advantage
grew as other currencies, particularly the yen, began to appreciate
against the dollar. This must certainly be regarded as a factor in the
29.52% increase in Taiwan's exports from 1985 to 1986, and the 30.8%
increase in its exports to the United States during the same period. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the exchange rate has received considera-
ble attention from the United States. Due at least in part to such pres-
sure, the NT dollar appreciated 25% against the United States dollar
219 Taiwan's first dumping case, brought in 1987, found dumping margins of 25% and 40% on
two different types of plywood imported from Indonesia. China Post, Mar. 3, 1987, at 7, col. 2.
220 T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 53.
221 Sun & Lee, supra note 53, at 58-59.
222 From 1953 until 1983, Taiwan's annual economic growth rate averaged 8.7%, while the in-
dustrialized countries recorded an annual 3.8% growth rate. Id at 63.
223 Id at 63-64.
224 FINANCIAL STATISTICS MONTHLY (March 1987), table 27.
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from mid-1986 to mid-1987. 225 Time will tell if the past year's revalua-
tion will produce a commensurate change in the Taiwan-United States
trade imbalance.226 In any event, the "exchange rate subsidy" has surely
been reduced.
As already noted, average per capita income in Taiwan was one-fifth
of that in the United States during 1983. According to a United States
Department of Labor survey, the average United States factory worker
earned $12.82 an hour, while his counterpart in Taiwan was earning
$1.48 an hour.227 At the same time, Taiwan companies have been slow
to comply with some legal requirements mandating employee benefits;
for example, it was reported recently that only 6,000 of the 70,000 firms
requested by the Labor Standards Bureau in April 1987 to meet the re-
quirements of the Labor Standards Law for setting aside retirement
funds had complied.228 Thus, it is no wonder that a product made in
Taiwan can be sold more cheaply than the same product made in the
United States.
But this situation, too, continues to change. The average monthly
income of workers in Taiwan in 1986 was NT$12,851, up NT$822 from
1985.229 After having received a complaint from an American Chamber
of Commerce member about rising wages, Vice Economics Minister Li
Mo expressed fears that wages were pushing up production costs and
driving away prospective investors.230 Similarly, Economics Minister
Lee Ta-hai expressed concern during a spring 1987 interview that rising
wages are hurting the labor-intensive industries and urged factories to
raise their productivity or be crowded out of the market.231 At the same
time, reports are surfacing in the American financial press observing that
225 Tung, NT$ to Bottom Out at 30:1 ForA While, Econ. News, Aug. 24, 1987, at I, col. 1.
226 In late 1986 and early 1987 (when the exchange rate was approaching 35:1), reports were
circulating of surveys that "25 to 50% of local enterprises would suffer if the exchange rate hit
NT$35," or that "NT$34 was a bottom line for some industries, while others could manage to
survive at NT$32 dollars." China Post, Jan. 24, 1987, at 7, col. 2. By mid-1987, however, one was
beginning to see articles like NT$ Appreciation Provides Stimulus for Higher Productivity, China
News, May 21, 1987, at 8, col. 1 and Local Businessmen Learn Quickly How to Deal With Changing
Exchange Rates, China News, June 1, 1987, at 8, col. 1. Indeed, the NT dollar appreciation was a
boon of sorts to the government, which stood to save some NT$50 billion from its foreign exchange
spending during fiscal 1988 as a result, China News, May 28, 1987, at 2, col. 7, while the dollar's fall
has already had the effect of increasing prices in the U.S. Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 1, 5, col.
6.
227 China Post, Jan. 16, 1987, at 3, col. 7.
228 China News, May 12, 1987, at 8, col. 6.
229 China Post, May 19, 1987, at 11, col. 7.




"the gap between U.S. and foreign pay is disappearing quickly.
232
Thus, Taiwan's "labor subsidy" may also have begun to erode.
The role of United States influence in Taiwan during the import sub-
stitution period of the 1950's described in Part II.C. of this article and
the subsequent formulation of export promotion policies described in
Part II.D also deserves attention. Professor Neil Jacoby's masterful
study of United States economic assistance to Taiwan over the period
from 1951 to 1965 documents strong support for adoption of export in-
centives. After focusing on infrastructure development and industrial
projects from 1956 to 1960, United States Agency of International Devel-
opment ("AID") emphasis shifted in 1961 to fostering of private enter-
prise, promotion of exports, and termination of United States
concessional assistance.233 Jacoby described United States AID input as
follows:
The establishment during 1959 of an Industrial Development and In-
vestment Center and of the China Development Corporation in Taiwan re-
flected these new purposes. During the same year the Director of AID
Mission to China proposed that the Chinese government should adopt a
comprehensive set of public policies to foster private investment and expand
exports, looking toward the phasing-out of U.S. aid. In 1960, stimulated by
a promise of special U.S. aid, the Chinese government agreed to a 19-Point
Program of Economic and Financial Reform.2 34
Thus, Taiwan's export promotion policies described in Part II.D and the
legal and regulatory provisions effectuating them described in Part III
were put in place with the active encouragement of the United States
government.
In addition to encouraging Taiwan's adoption of export incentives,
the United States AID mission "went on to publicize Taiwan as an in-
vestment site, and the United States government utilized several pro-
grams to facilitate and protect the flow of private capital to Taiwan. "235
Following the establishment by General Instruments of a bonded elec-
tronics factory near Taipei in 1964, "its rapid success demonstrated the
potential of off-shore assembly in Taiwan to other American firms.
''236
232 Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
233 N. JACOBY, U.S. AID TO TAIwAN: A STUDY OF FOREIGN AID, SELF-HELP, AND DEVELOP-
MENT 34 (1966).
234 Mca at 35. Other commentators confirm these observations. Eg., T. GOLD, supra note 9, at
77; Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 70-71 (F. Deyo ed. 1987); Koo, The Interplay of State, Social Class, and
World Systems in East Asian Development" The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 168-69 (F. Deyo ed. 1987).
235 T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 79.
236 Id
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Thus, United States companies have increasingly used Taiwan as a sourc-
ing site, encouraged by the dual investment and export incentives which
the United States government helped to put in place. The resulting im-
pact on Taiwan's exports to the United States has been significant. From
1981-1983, for example, about 68% of the products produced in Taiwan
by United States companies were shipped to the United States at a total
value of $2.4 billion, or 14.2% of Taiwan's trade surplus with the United
States during the three-year period.237 In addition to United States in-
vested producers or subcontractors in Taiwan, United States importers,
particularly mass marketers, have also benefited indirectly from Taiwan's
export incentives, as they source materials there and sell them in the
United States at very competitive prices.2 38 United States companies
themselves are therefore among the beneficiaries of Taiwan's export
incentives.
Taiwan, of course, is not the only Asian country which has pro-
moted exports in order to enhance its economic development. Compari-
son of its export incentive structure with those of its Asian neighbors
indicates significant differences. Relevant points of comparison in this
regard would include the relative size of companies and the nature of the
business/government relationship as between countries, since these fac-
tors necessarily influence the manner in which energies can be mobilized
toward attaining a particular policy objective-in this case, enhancing
export sales through subsidization. A number of commentators have ob-
served the proliferation of small and medium size companies in Taiwan
relative to the comparatively larger business enterprises and combina-
tions more frequently found in Japan and Korea.239 With respect to gov-
237 Sun & Lee, supra note 53, at 74; see also J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS 137-38 (1987); Sease, U.S. Firms Fuel Taiwan's
Trade Surplus, Asian Wall St. J., June 8, 1987, at 1, 16.
238 See T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 81-82; Sease, supra note 237.
239
In Taiwan 42 percent of all employees worked in factories of at least one hundred persons
in 1961; the percentage rose to 64 percent in 1971, thereafter declining to 33 percent by 1980.
Contrary to this pattern of smaller enterprises, South Korea workers in factories of at least one
hundred employees rose from 33 percent of the workforce in 1960 to 56 percent in 1968 and 74
percent in 1974.
Deyo, State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 195 (F. Deyo ed. 1987). According to the January
1987 ROC MONTHLY BULLETIN OF LABOR STATISTICS, 24% of Taiwan's industrial employees,
(1,891,000 of 7,986,000) worked in establishments of 100 or more, while 76% (6,095,000) worked in
establishments of less than 100; indeed 54 1/2% of the total were shown as working in establish-
ments of less than 10. SILIN, supra note 205, at 14, on the other hand, has pointed out that at the
end of 1966, firms employing 100 or more people, while only 2.8% of the total firms, represented
82.7% of capital and had 74.5% of the total revenue. Yet, although observers were able to distin-
guish about 100 significant business groups (Kuan-hsi ch'i-ye) in Taiwan by 1976, T. GOLD, supra
note 9, at 89, characterizes them as "but a shadow of their East Asian cousins, Japan's zaibatsu and
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eminent-business relations, commentators have also pointed out distinct
differences between Taiwan on the one hand and Japan and Korea on the
other.240 Gold has characterized Taiwan's private sector as "much more
anarchic and self-directed than its Japanese or Korean counterparts."'
These underlying differences help to explain why, although "it is true
that both South Korea and Japan have reduced or eliminated many of
the subsidies and other selective targeting measures they have employed
in the past, Taiwan has always used less."242
VII. CONCLUSION
In attempting to explain why the falling dollar has not helped to
shrink America's trade deficit, Jeff Faux, president of the Economic Pol-
icy Institute, has written:
[Tihe high dollar lured new foreign firms into markets that had been
held by Americans. These competitors have not disappeared with the lower
dollar but are fighting more fiercely to keep their market shares. Since
many of them are subsidized by their governments, they are willing to take
lower profits, often losses to maintain production and employment at
home.
243
Staffan Burenstam Linder has succinctly described the demonstration ef-
fect of Asia's newly industrialized countries' ("NICs") shift of emphasis
Korea's chaebol, in terms of capital, scale, control of their own trade, and government connections."
Although "the government has identified the small size of the typical Taiwanese firm as a barrier to
Taiwan's long-term competitiveness, [its] efforts to encourage mergers and the formation of large
trading companies... have not met with notable success." J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, supra note
237, at 126. Although the small size of Taiwan firms may limit their ability to respond to protection-
ist pressures in their major markets or to explore new markets, id., the same factor has made them
"highly adaptable [and able to] quickly adjust their operations to meet the import needs of the US."
Sun & Lee, supra note 53, at 73.
240
Whereas in Japan, regularized consultations between MITI and industry representatives
helped determine industrial policy, and Korea has seen a more brutish, commandist approach,
in Taiwan planners retained an aloof posture. They met to formulate policy and then relayed
their decisions and attendant mechanisms to implement it to the business community and
watched what happened.
T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 126; see also J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, supra note 237, at 14-19. SILIN,
supra note 205, at 20, quotes a Taiwan executive as follows:
In Korea the government helps business plan and is cooperative. Here there are more
problems and government controls. In large firms you need lots of materials for economic
planning, but government does not supply them ... [We] have four-year plans but they are
always the same-expand, expand ... There is no coordination or planning in depth.
For a more detailed discussion of the planning process, see Chao, Planning in a Market Economy-
The Experience of Taiwan, ROC, 226 ECON. REv. 8-17 (Jul-Aug. 1985).
241 T. GOLD, supra note 9, at 126.
242 J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, supra note 237, at 167.
243 Faux, Here Lies Free Trade R..P., N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1987, at 19, col. 1.
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from import substitution to export promotion. 244 The impact is self-evi-
dent: "The four Asian NICs, with under 2% of the total population of
the developing world, have almost 7% of its GDP, close to 20% of its
total trade, and nearly 60% of its manufactured exports.,
24
To attribute such results to subsidies in the case of Taiwan, how-
ever, ignores the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the
countervailing duty cases which are the subject of this Article. Many of
the export incentives employed by Taiwan have been determined not to
constitute subsidies. Those that have been regarded as subsidies have not
involved excessive sums; the highest was 2.128% .2 6 Given the fact that
these are the results of proceedings initiated by United States petitioners
who apparently believed that injurious subsidies existed, it is unlikely
that a significant number of Taiwan subsidies presently lurk in the
bushes, simply waiting to be exposed.
Perhaps Taiwan's relatively low level of subsidization reflects an un-
derstanding of the problems associated with introduction of a set of dis-
tortive policies rendering export more profitable than production for the
home market.247 Perhaps Taiwan's recent efforts to reduce the level of
its import barriers248 reflects an appreciation of the fact that rather than
reduce imports and expand exports, protectionism reduces both imports
and exports.24 9 The United States-Taiwan trade imbalance demands at-
tention. To develop an effective solution, however, requires a correct def-
inition of the problem. The United States countervailing duty cases since
1980 involving imports from Taiwan indicate unequivocally that the
problem is not excessive subsidization.
244 S. LINDER, THE PACIFIC CENTURY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ASIAN-
PACIFIC DYNAMISM 39-41 (1986).
245 Id. at 39.
246 See supra notes 139-82 and accompanying text.
247 As Linder points out, "it is certainly possible to waste resources by pushing goods onto the
international markets at prices that do not reflect the full sacrifice needed to produce them." S.
LINDER, supra note 244, at 35.
248 For descriptions of these efforts, see Chao, Liberalization, Internationalization and Systemiza-
tion: New Currents in Taiwan's Economic Development, 227 ECON. REV. 1-5 (Sept.-Oct. 1985);
Tsiang, Chen & Hsieh, Progress in Trade Liberalization Taiwan, Republic of China, 230 ECON. REV.
1-13 (Mar.-Apr. 1986).
249 S. LINDER, supra note 244, at 102. This principle, of course, is not uniformly accepted. See
e.g., R. LUEDDE-NEURATH, IMPORT CONTROLS AND EXPORT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT: A RE-
ASSESSMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE (1986).
